

December 13, 2007

MITCHELL REPORT PRESS CONFERENCE

SENATOR MITCHELL: Thank you all. Good afternoon and thank you for joining us. I will make a detailed statement about the findings and of the report and copies of which have been made available to you. It will also be posted shortly on Major League Baseball's Web site, MLB.com.

I ask for your patience during my remarks. Professor McLaren will follow with a brief statement, and then we'll be glad to take your questions.

First I'd like to recognize people whose advice has been helpful to me in considering these important issues. Richard McLaren is a law professor for at the University of Western Ontario. He's widely respected for his experience as a sports arbitrator. He's a member of the Court of Arbitration For Sport and served as an on-site arbitrator for four Olympic games. He has presided over many proceedings involving positive drug tests and recently he was an arbitrator in Floyd Landis' challenge during the 2006 Tour de France.

Dr. Gary Green, also widely represented, is a professor of sports medicine at UCLA. He conducts research on performance-enhancing substances at the UCLA Olympic analytic laboratory. He chairs the NCAA committee on drug testing and drug education for five years. He's a consultant to Major League Baseball on steroids, and other performance-enhancing substances.

Several members of my staff are here. Charlie Scheeler is here, supervised the investigation, seated next to him is John Clarke, who supervised preparation of the report. Also present are Peter Pantaleo, Brett Ingerman and Mark Muedeking, who played important roles in this investigation. All of them are lawyers at DLA Piper. There are others who worked hard on this

investigation and report, and I thank all of them for their effort, their dedication and their wise counsel.

The Commissioner and the 30 Major League clubs are subject to the provisions of the Basic Agreement with the Players Association. This imposes limitations on the disclosure of information about baseball's drug program. The Commissioner and I agreed that his office would have the right to review my report three business days before its release to make certain that I did not improperly include in it any information that is required to be kept confidential.

They did so. No material changes were made as a result of that review. For more than a decade there has been widespread illegal use of anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball in violation of federal law and baseball policy. Club officials routinely have discussed the possibility of substance use when evaluating players. The response by baseball was slow to develop and was initially ineffective. But it gained momentum after the adoption of a mandatory random drug testing program in 2002. That program has been effective in that detectable steroid use appears to have declined. But the use of human growth hormone has risen, because unlike steroids, it is not detectable through urine testing.

This report describes how and why this problem emerged. We identify some of the players who were caught up in the drive to gain a competitive advantage through the illegal use of these substances. Other investigations no doubt will turn up more names and fill in more details. But that is unlikely to significantly alter the description of baseball's steroids era as set forth in this report.

While this investigation was prompted by revelations about the involvement of players with the Bay Area laboratory cooperative, the evidence we uncovered indicates that this has not been an isolated problem involving just a few players or a few clubs. Many players were involved. Each of the 30 clubs has had players who have been involved with such substances at some time in their careers. There have been many estimates of use, all of them impossible to verify.

However, it is a fact that between five and seven percent of the Major League players who

participated in anonymous survey testing in 2003 tested positive. Those figures almost certainly understated the actual level of use since players knew they would be tested at some time during the year. The use of human growth hormone was not detectable in the tests that were conducted, and as many experts have noted, a negative test does not necessarily mean that a player has not been using such substances.

The illegal use of these substances to improve athletic performance may cause serious harm to the user. Apart from the dangers posed to the Major League player himself, however, his use of these substances encourages young athletes to use them; because adolescents are always subject to significant hormonal changes, the abuse of steroids and other substances can have more serious effects on them than they have on adults. Many young Americans are placing themselves at risk. Some estimates appear to show a recent decline in steroid use by high school students. That's heartening. But the range of estimates is from about three to six percent, and even the lower figure means that hundreds of thousands of high school-aged young people are illegally using steroids.

It's important to deal with the players who are illegal users. But it's at least as important, perhaps even more so, to be concerned about the reality that hundreds of thousands of our children are using them. Every American, not just baseball fans, ought to be shocked into action by that disturbing truth.

I'd like to recognize Don Hooton who is here today, who established the Taylor Hooton Foundation for fighting steroid abuse after his son took his own life after abusing anabolic steroids. In a congressional hearing in 2005, Don said, and I quote, "Our youngsters hear the message loud and clear. And it's wrong. If you would want to achieve your goal, it's okay to use steroids to get you there, because the pros are doing it. It's a real challenge for parents to overpower the strong message that's being sent to our children by your behavior."

The illegal use in baseball of these substances also victimizes the majority of players who don't use them. We heard from many former players who believed it was grossly unclear that the users were gaining an advantage. One former player told us that one of the biggest complaints among players was that a guy is using steroids and he's taking my spot.

Through the efforts of the United States attorneys office for the northern district of California and federal law enforcement agencies, we obtained the cooperation of former New York Mets clubhouse employee, Kirk Radomski. Radomski was interviewed by me and members of my investigative staff four times with federal law enforcement representatives participating in all interviews and his left-hander in three of them.

Radomski identified a number of current or former Major League players to whom he said he illegal sold steroids, human growth hormone, and other substances. We also obtained information from sources other than Radomski about players' illegal possession and/or use of such substances. These included several former Major League players and former strength and conditioning coaches, some of whom met with us voluntarily. Others did so at the request of federal law enforcement officials.

As a result, we gathered sufficient evidence about their possession or use of performance-enhancing substances to identify in this report, dozens of current or former players in Major League Baseball.

Each of the players was invited to meet with me so I could provide him with information about the allegations and give him an opportunity to respond. Almost without exception, all current players declined my invitation and refused to meet or to talk with me.

I carefully reviewed and considered all of the information we received about the purchase, possession or use of performance-enhancing substances by Major League players. Kirk Radomski provided substantial information about the distribution of such substances, and in many cases his statements were corroborated by other evidence. That corroboration took many forms, including 11 players admitted that Radomski had supplied them with such substances, just as he told us: Checks or money orders written to Radomski by some players in appropriate amounts; mailing receipts or shipments by Radomski to some players; statements by other witnesses supporting the allegations of use by some players; the names, addresses, and/or telephone numbers of many players were found in Radomski's seized address book; telephone records showing calls between Radomski and some players; and a positive drug test.

Brian McNamee is a former Major League

strength and conditioning coach. He said that he was a direct eyewitness and a participant in illegal use by three players who he served as a personal trainer. I interviewed him three times with his personal left-hander, federal law enforcement officials and members of my staff participating in each interview.

Some other players are named based on information obtained from persons other than Radomski or McNamee.

Even before mandatory drug testing began, Radomski said players moved away from oil-based steroids that stay in the body for a long time to water-based steroids that cleared the body faster and to human growth hormone. A detailed discussion is provided in the report of Radomski's network of customers and for other players whom evidence has been obtained of their alleged possession or use of performance-enhancing substances.

The clubs and the Players Association adopted the joint-drug program in 2002. The testing of players has been conducted since 2003, first in the form of anonymous survey testing that year, and after that, in mandatory random testing that now carries with it strong penalties for violations. During the investigation, we looked into -- we received and looked into allegations that some players received advance notice of what were supposed to be unannounced tests. The results of our inquiry are detailed in the report.

The drug testing in all sports, including the Olympics have evolved over time through a process of trial and error, as the programs were modified to address problems and concerns as they arose. In that respect, baseball's program has been like all of the others. Adoption of the current program was a positive first step and there have been meaningful improvements. In some respects, however, it still falls short of the current level of best practices in drug testing.

The challenge now is to take the program to a new and higher level, and then to continue the process of improvement to deal with the problems and concerns which cannot be foreseen but which inevitably will arise. In this report, I make a series of recommendations to achieve that objective. Some can be implemented unilaterally by the Commissioner. Some are subject to collective bargaining and therefore, will require the agreement of the Players Association.

The recommendations focus on three areas. First, investigations based on non-testing

evidence. Some illegal substances are difficult or virtually impossible to detect. Indeed, one leading expert has argued that testing only scratches the surface. The ability to investigate vigorously allegations of violations is an essential part of any meaningful drug prevention program. I recommend that the Commissioner create a department of investigations led by a senior executive to respond promptly and aggressively to allegations of the illegal use or possession of performance-enhancing substances.

Second, improved educational program about the dangers of substance used are critical to any effort to deter use.

Third, although it is clear that even the best drug testing program by itself is not sufficient, drug testing remains an important element of a comprehensive approach to combat illegal use. The current program was agreed to in 2006 and will remain in effect until 2011. Any changes to the program; therefore, must be negotiated with and agreed to by the Players Association.

In this report I set forth the principles that presently characterize a state-of-the-art drug testing program, and I urge the clubs and the Players Association to incorporate them into baseball's program when they next negotiate on this issue. They include: The program should be administered by a truly independent person who holds exclusive authority over its structure and administration. It should be transparent to the public, allowing for periodic audits of its operation and reporting of its data and test results. It should include adequate year-round unannounced testing, and employ best practices as they develop. To ensure that the independent administrator accomplishes these objectives, the program should self-sufficient funding and it should continue to respect the legitimate privacy and due process rights of the players.

The onset of mandatory random drug testing is the single most important step taken so far to combat the problem, but it was delayed for years by the opposition of the Players Association. However there is validity to the assertion by the Players Association that prior to 2002, the owners did not push hard for mandatory random drug testing because they were much more concerned about the serious economic issues facing baseball.

To prolong that debate will not resolve it. Each side will dig in its heels even further. But it could detract from what I believe to be a critical

necessity: The need for everyone in baseball to work together to devise and implement the strongest possible strategy to combat the illegal use of such substances including the recommendations set forth in this report.

I was asked to conduct this investigation and to report what I found as fairly, as accurately, and as thoroughly as I could. I've done so. Only the Commissioner has the authority to take disciplinary action subject to the player's right to a hearing.

I urge the Commissioner to forego imposing discipline on players for past violations of baseball's rules on performance-enhancing substances, including the players named in this report, except in those cases where he determines that the conduct is so serious that discipline is necessary to maintain the integrity of the game.

I make this recommendation fully aware that there are valid arguments both for and against it. But I believe that those in favor are compelling. First, a principle goal of this investigation is to bring to a close this troubling chapter in baseball's history, and to use the lessons learned from the past to prevent the future use of such substances. While that requires us to look back, as this report necessarily does, all efforts should now be directed to the future.

That's why the recommendations I make are prospective. They look forward. Spending more months or even years in contentious disciplinary proceedings will keep everyone mired in the past.

Second, most of the violations in this report of distant in time. For current players, the allegations of possession and use are at least two, and as many as nine years old. This was a time when baseball made many changes in its drug policies and programs. It went from limited probable cause testing to mandatory random testing. Since 2002, the penalties under the program have been increased several times. Human growth hormone was not included as a prohibited substance until 2005. And under the basic principles of law an employer must imply the policies in place at the time of the conduct in question, in determining what, if any, discipline is appropriate.

Until 2005, there was no penalty for a positive -- for a first positive drug test; although the Commissioner has always had the authority to impose discipline for just cause based on evidence of use obtained outside of the drug program.

Third, and related, more than half of the players mentioned in this report are no longer playing in Major League Baseball or in its affiliated minor leagues; and thus, are beyond the authority of the Commissioner to impose discipline.

Fourth, I've reported what I learned. But I acknowledge and even emphasize the obvious; there is much about performance-enhancing substances in baseball that I did not learn. There have been other suppliers and other users past and present. Radomski himself said that some players told him they had other sources, and the evidence is clear that many players have obtained such substances through so-called rejuvenation centers using prescriptions of doubtful validity.

Fifth, the Commissioner promised, and I agreed, that the public should know what I learned from this investigation. The most important thing I learned is that this is a serious problem that cannot be solved by anything less than a well-planned and well-executed effort by everyone involved in baseball. From my experience in Northern Ireland, I learned that letting go of the past and looking to the future is a very hard but necessary step to dealing with an ongoing problem. That's what baseball now needs.

The Commissioner should give the players and everyone else the chance to make a fresh start, except where the conduct is so serious that he must act to protect the integrity of the game. That would be a tangible and positive way for him to demonstrate to the players, to the clubs, to the fans and to the general public his desire for the cooperative effort that baseball needs to deal effectively with this problem.

It also would give him a clear and convincing basis for imposing strong discipline for future violations.

There's been a lot of speculation about this report. Much of it is focused on players' names, how many, and which ones. After considering that issue very carefully, I concluded that it's appropriate and necessary to include them in this report. Otherwise, I would not have done what I was asked to do; to try to find out what happened, and to report what I learned accurately, fairly and thoroughly.

While the interest in names is understandable, I hope the media, baseball fans and the general public will keep that part of the report in context and will focus on what I believe to be the most important part of the report, its

conclusions and recommendations.

In closing, I repeat and emphasize that the use of steroids in Major League Baseball was widespread. The response by baseball was slow to develop and was initially ineffective. For many years, citing concerns for the privacy rights of players, the Players Association opposed mandatory random drug testing of his members for steroids and other substances. But in 2002, the effort gained momentum after the clubs and the Players Association agreed to and adopted a mandatory random drug testing program. The current program has been effective in that detectable steroid use appears to have declined.

But many players have shifted to human growth hormone, which is not detectable in any currently available urine test. The minority of players who used such substances were wrong. They violated federal law and baseball policy, and they distorted the fairness of competition by trying to gain an unfair advantage over the majority of players who followed the law and the rules. They, the players who follow the law and the rules, are faced with the painful choice of either being placed at a competitive disadvantage, or becoming illegal users themselves. No one should have to make that choice.

Obviously the players who illegally used performance-enhancing substances are responsible for their actions, but they did not act in a vacuum. Everyone involved in baseball over the past two decades, commissioners, club officials, the Players Association, the players, shares to some extent in the responsibility of the steroids area. There was a collective failure to recognize the problem as it emerged and to deal with it early on. As a result, an environment developed in which illegal use became widespread.

Knowledge and understanding of the past are essential if the problem is to be dealt with effectively in the future. But being chained to the past is not helpful. Baseball does not need and cannot afford to engage in the never-ending search for every player who used performance-enhancing substances.

The Commissioner was right to ask for this investigation and report. It would have been impossible to get closure without it or something like it. But it's now time to look to the future, to get on with the important and difficult task that lies ahead.

Everyone in Major League Baseball should join in a cooperative and sustained effort to bring

the era of steroids and human growth hormone to an end and to prevent its recurrence in some other form in the future. That's the only way this cloud will be removed from the game. The adoption of the recommendations suggested in this report will be a first step in that direction.

Thank you for your attention, and I'm now pleased to invite Professor McLaren to the podium.

PROFESSOR McLAREN: I would like to thank Senator Mitchell for the honor and privilege of advising him on this important project. I assisted in the preparation of portions of this report, and I have reviewed the entire report very carefully. From my experience in sport, I expect that many in the media and public will first direct their attention to those named in this report. That is a natural thing to do. But baseball and the public should quickly move beyond that, and focus their attention to the recommendations.

Senator Mitchell's recommendations are exactly what baseball needs to remove the stain of performance-enhancing substance used in the game. He has stated precisely what is needed for a state-of-the-art drug testing program; most notably, first, the program should be administered by a truly independent authority that holds exclusive jurisdiction over its structure and administration.

Two, a transparent program that preserves complete records from which reports are produced, enabling the public to judge its integrity.

And three, adherence to best practices in drug testing and in particular, adequate, unannounced year round testing so that players are always at risk of being tested in and out of competition.

However, those who would enable athletes to cheat are constantly devising new substances which are difficult to detect. Today, except for a blood test which has severe practical limitations, there is no test which can effectively detect the use of human growth hormone. Similarly, so-called designer steroids are continuously being developed, which are very difficult to detect using current techniques.

Finally, professional athletes have gone to great lengths to engage in a wide variety of activities to mask their use of illegal substances. Using best practices, it is possible to foil many of these efforts through drug testing, but no drug testing program has ever been created which catches all the illegal substance users.

Accordingly, even the best testing program available today is not enough by itself. Again, Senator Mitchell's recommendations to address this issue is the right one. Baseball must aggressively address allegations of substance violations where evidently in the last week it has shown improvement. Nevertheless, it needs an investigation's head which reports directly to baseball. That department should have the same type of protections and that internal affairs departments of law enforcement agencies receive so that the public can have confidence that baseball is acting vigilantly in keeping its house clean.

Finally I hope that not only does baseball improve its anti-steroids educational efforts, but that this report serves as a springboard to increase public awareness of this serious problem, and how it affects not only sports, but also our children. I strongly agree with Don Hooton when he says the decisions professional athletes make about the use of prohibited substances have an important effect on our youth.

I commend Senator Mitchell in his work and join in his request that all the work be centered on his recommendations.

SENATOR MITCHELL: My thanks to McLaren and pleased to take questions.

Q. You're could be commended for the work you've done, and if your allegations are correct, you're asking baseball fans across the United States and Canada to continue cheering for liars, cheaters, hypocrites by saying that we don't want to go prosecute these people or punish them for what they did in the past; isn't that a terrible message to send to the children who enjoy baseball? How do we root for these people? Why wouldn't they do it again if they can get away with it?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Anyone who has ever tried to play baseball knows how rare the skills are that enable a player to reach the Major League Baseball talent. Major League players are different than the rest of us. But in every other way, they are just like the rest of us. We are all human, we all make mistakes. I know that in my life, I've made many mistakes and I've tried to learn from them.

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There is no one answer that fits every violation. What's needed is a common sense analysis that strikes the right balance among all of the important values that are involved. That's what my recommendations try to do. Even before I made them, I recognized, and I acknowledged, that there are valid arguments to the contrary. You've stated so. I accept that. But I also accept the responsibility that comes with this investigation and with this report.

In the end, I believe that I can best meet that responsibility by saying what I believe is the best way to combat the use of performance-enhancing substances in the future. That's what my recommendations are intended to do and I hope they will be adopted.

Q. You briefly mentioned some of the behaviors of the club officials; how culpable do you think the owners are and general managers in baseball for looking the other way? You mentioned the steroids came up in their discussions in the evaluations of players, but for most of your comments, you were talking about decisions by players to take drugs and the effects that that would have on young baseball players. Are you also pointing the finger at, you know, owners, directors of the team you're working with?

SENATOR MITCHELL: I said, and I repeat, everyone involved in baseball, commissioners, club officials, Players Association, players, shares responsibility. I can't be any clearer than that; everybody involved. It is not my intention to assign numerical figures to allocate responsibility. That's neither necessary nor useful.

Q. You named names of players. I haven't read through the whole report. Do you name certain club officials who you hold accountable, too, as well or certain owners?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Numerous club officials are named in the report.

Q. Appreciative of history, reading a chapter on Roger Clemens -- (no microphone, indiscernible) -- that Clemens was a repeated drug cheat, would you characterize it that way, and would you agree with a verdict of history that he should not be allowed into the Hall of Fame, he and other prominent ballplayers should not even be admitted or be prosecuted criminally?

SENATOR MITCHELL: I was asked to look into what happened and to report on it and I've done so.

The questions you ask are properly directed to others who will be responsible for those decisions in the future. Nobody asked me to make any judgment on any individual beyond those that I have made, and I do not think it will be useful, appropriate or helpful for me to go beyond what I have said which is what I was asked to do. Others have judgments to make, as well.

Q. Since we're talking about -- (no microphone, indiscernible) -- can you give us some sort of idea about how many people worked with you on this committee to gather all of this information and what cost this was and how it was funded?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Yes, we were retained by the Commissioner of baseball. Our firm, DLA Piper, has a long-standing policy that we do not comment on client matters. Any such decisions are made by the client and we think that policy should be followed here.

I can tell you that there were as many as two dozen people who worked on the investigation and report at various times. None of us did it full-time. All of us were engaged in other activities throughout the period that the investigation was being conducted. Some worked very briefly on it. Others like Charlie Scheeler and John Clarke, worked extensively on it as I did myself, particularly in recent months.

Q. You had talked about the independent agency or the independent person being addressed at the next time collective bargaining was reopened. Is that to say that you're not recommending that the players and the union go in now, reopen the agreement and make some of these changes immediately? Do you think it can wait until 2011?

SENATOR MITCHELL: That is their decision to make. Obviously given what I've

described as the rapidly-changed nature of the problem, the constant effort by those engaged in illegal activities to devise and distribute new so-called designer steroids that avoid detection, there has to be constant improvement.

And my personal preference, of course, would be that both the clubs and the Players Association will want to take a fresh look at it at their earliest opportunity.

Q. Senator Mitchell, you spoke about the climate in baseball prior to the 2002 collective bargaining negotiations. You spoke about how the union had its objectives and baseball had its objectives, and you mentioned economics, they were more concerned -- I believe those were your words; they were more concerned with economics. Given you've been a follower of the relationship between Major League Baseball and its union during that period, can you talk about your impression about why things evolved in 2001, 2002; why ownership might have been reluctant to bring it up for economic reasons, or because of the union's power at the time, and what you think the union was trying to achieve during this period, as well.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, first, let me say that all of that is covered in great detail in the report. I recognize that you have not had an opportunity to read it, but I hope you will do so because the history is important to establish a context for current actions and current decisions.

Hindsight is always perfect. We all see with 20/20 vision when looking at the past and having benefit of knowledge of events that have occurred in intervening years.

What the report says is that baseball officials generally did not express to us a keen awareness of the issue prior to 1998 when the publicity focused on Mark McGwire. And after that there was a process of laying the foundation for the negotiations that would follow for the next round to establish a mandatory random testing program.

There was in place a testing program known, for lack of a better term, as the reasonable cause program, under which several players were, in fact, tested. It was an ineffective system for reasons described in our report, and acknowledged by, certainly, baseball officials quoted in the report.

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So it was a process of becoming aware, laying the foundation for, and taking the steps necessary to deal with the problem. We make clear in our report by citing many published reports prior to them quoting many members of the press, who wrote articles and made comments prior to 1998 about the problem.

So there was -- there was some indication, public and otherwise, of a problem prior to that.

Q. Can I just follow-up, would you briefly characterize this dynamic that existed between 2001 and 2002 that existed between the ownership and union and what each was trying to achieve at that time --

SENATOR MITCHELL: I was not a party to those negotiations, and so any information I have on that is derivative and distant and I would really prefer to have those who are directly involved characterize them.

Q. You mentioned that you hope the Commissioner wouldn't punish players that were named in the report, but you put a caveat out there about players who may have really gone above and beyond in their indiscretions. Is that a Barry Bonds reference?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No. That is not a reference to any individual. That is a reference to my belief that the Commissioner must have the ability to make the determinations which I've set forth, and alone can judge which actions are so egregious that to protect the integrity of the game, discipline is required. It is not a reference to any particular player.

Q. There's a lot of information in the report that prosecutors, in theory, at least, could bring up criminal cases. Are you and your staff prepared to possibly be subpoenaed, subpoena evidence and that kind of thing if that were to happen?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Most prosecuting agencies in the United States, including the Department of Justice, have for many years pursued a policy in which they do not prosecute end users of drugs such as performance-enhancing substances. And instead, concentrate their prosecutorial resources on the manufacturers, distributors, who illegally produce and sell them to the athletes.

Indeed, over the past several years, somewhere around 250 professional baseball

players, major and minor league alike, have been publicly identified as having been suspended for a positive drug test. I have inquired of both the Commissioner and the Players Association, whether they had of any knowledge of any player, any of those 250, about whom the evidence was public, had been prosecuted for that offense. There answer was no, it has not happened throughout the whole history of this program. And there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that it will happen in the future.

Indeed, the recent actions by all of the prosecutors involved at the federal and state level have conformed to the prior policy which I described, and although many opportunities existed for them to prosecute individuals, they have decided not to do so.

I can say to you that I served as a United States Attorney, and I made similar decisions when I was in the position that officials now hold on these matters. And every prosecutor must make determinations on the allocation of resources and what you're going to prosecute. And we pursued policies in a different context that was similar in nature.

Q. And did you cross-reference any other sport -- (inaudible)?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Our mandate was limited to baseball and we limited our activities to baseball.

Q. I apologize because I've only had time to skim the report, but with the exception of interviews with Brian McNamee, almost everything I've seen in the report has followed something that was previously reported in the media. Your charge at the beginning of this investigation, if I recall, was to follow the trail wherever it leads, however high it leads, and I just wonder, two questions. Now that it's over, are you satisfied with the amount of fresh information that you were able to produce, and secondly, were you satisfied with the cooperation of the players and the Players Union in acquiring the information?

SENATOR MITCHELL: The answer to the first question is yes.

The answer to the second question is that the Players Union was largely uncooperative for reasons which I think are understandable.

Q. Could you give me an idea of how much of this report is based on -- you said there were other people, can you put a number on it?

SENATOR MITCHELL: I would prefer that you read the report and make your own judgment. I don't have a numerical value assigned to information. I think in any event that requires subjective judgments that most people would have different views on.

Q. Just wondering what would you would say to critics who would say your role is somehow compromised by your other role, as I believe a director with the Boston Red Sox.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Right, well, first of course, the investigation did not focus on any one club or any one player. Kirk Radomski lived in New York, and as a result, he dealt with more players from New York. We of course did not select Kirk Radomski and we did not select the players that he dealt with.

We just asked him to tell us what happened. We told him we wanted only the truth, nothing but the truth. We didn't want anything more than he knew or anything less than he knew. Indeed, we told that to every witness.

With respect to the other question, when I went to Northern Ireland, there was considerable controversy because some claimed that I had a conflict because I'm an American, I'm Catholic and I had family immigrate from the Republic of Ireland to the United States. The criticism I received there was far more harsh and intense than anything I've gotten here. But I didn't quit. I stayed with it. And eventually we got a peace agreement.

After I've finished my work there, since then, no one has ever repeated that claim. My request now is as it was in Northern Ireland: Judge me by my work. Take a look at how the investigation was conducted. Read the report. You will not find any evidence of bias, of special treatment, of the Red Sox or anyone else, because there is none. That had no effect, none whatsoever, on this investigation for this report.

And as to players, I remind you it is common now for players to serve many clubs. Many of the players named in this report played for many years with other clubs, including the Red Sox.

Thank you all very much.
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