Supreme Court overrules Humphrey’s Executor, upholds Federal Reserve independence: Key takeaways from Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook

On June 29, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions addressing presidential control over independent federal agencies. 

In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court held that for-cause removal protection for members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) violates the Constitution’s separation of powers, overruling Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and allowing the heads of most independent regulatory agencies to be subject to at-will presidential removal.

The same day, in Trump v. Cook, the Supreme Court’s ruling concerning the President’s authority to remove a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System confirmed that the Federal Reserve stands as a notable exception to Slaughter’s reach. 

Together, these decisions reshape and clarify the relationship between the President and independent agencies.

Case background

Trump v. Slaughter

The FTC is a multi-member regulatory agency that exercises rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers across multiple industry sectors, with responsibilities affecting nearly every part of the US economy. Its five Commissioners serve staggered seven-year terms. Since the agency’s creation in 1914, Congress had provided that the Commissioners were removable by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 41.

Upon taking office on January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump designated a new FTC Chair, and the former Chair resigned. President Trump subsequently removed two of the five remaining Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. The removal letters did not cite inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. Instead, the letters stated that the Commissioners’ “continued service” was “inconsistent with [the] Administration’s priorities” and that they were removed “pursuant to [the President’s] authority under Article II of the Constitution.”

Commissioner Slaughter filed suit seeking reinstatement, arguing her removal was ultra vires and violated both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution. The US District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for Commissioner Slaughter relying on Humphrey’s Executor, a unanimous 1935 Supreme Court decision that held that the statute protecting FTC Commissioners from at-will removal by the President did not violate the Constitution’s separation of powers. The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment, meaning that the matter was heard by the Supreme Court without first being reviewed by a federal court of appeals. 

Trump v. Cook

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is the principal governing body of the US central banking system, overseeing the Federal Reserve and playing a central role in monetary policy and financial regulation. Federal Reserve Governors serve 14-year terms, and federal law allows removal by the President “for cause.” 12 U.S.C. § 242.

In August 2025, President Trump purported to fire Governor Lisa D. Cook from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, marking the first effort to remove a Governor in the central bank’s 111-year history. The asserted basis for her removal was mortgage fraud. Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Bill Pulte accused Governor Cook of falsifying bank documents to obtain more favorable loan terms before joining the Federal Reserve. Governor Cook denied the allegations and filed suit, arguing that her removal failed to comply with federal statutory procedural protections, which require pre-removal notice and an opportunity to respond, and therefore was not for cause. The US District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction preventing Cook’s removal from taking effect. The government appealed and sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal. After the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to grant a stay, the government requested one from the Supreme Court.

The decisions

Trump v. Slaughter – FTC’s for-cause removal protection struck down

In a six-to-three decision, with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. The majority reasoned that Article II vests the executive power in the President and instructs that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” establishing a constitutional structure in which executive officers are subject to the President’s superintendence, including the President’s power of removal. 

The majority opinion described this principle as longstanding, while characterizing Humphrey’s Executor as an anomaly that had been narrowed over time. It stated that, “[a]t this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observation that an agency that ‘exercises no part of the executive power’ need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal,” and added that, “[i]f anything more is left of Humphrey’s, the Court overrules it.”

Applying this framework, the Court found that the FTC, long viewed as an “independent agency” distinct from executive branch agencies such as the Department of the Treasury, “unquestionably exercises executive power.” The FTC promulgates substantive rules carrying the force of law, investigates and enforces through in-house adjudications with monetary penalties, and files civil suits on behalf of the US. Because Commissioner Slaughter “served as the President’s subordinate,” the Court held that, under Article II, the President was “entitled to cut her tenure short.”

The Court recognized an important limitation: Because the FTC’s activities “fall well within the heartland of executive power,” the Court stated that it had “no occasion today to define the bounds of what such power entails.” The Court noted that not all offices created by Congress necessarily come with executive power and cited the Federal Reserve Board of Governors – the exception at issue in Trump v. Cook – as an example. The Court also left open the question of the constitutionality of tenure protections for judges serving on non-Article III courts, such as the Court of Federal Claims.

The dissenting justices argued that Humphrey’s Executor was settled precedent and that the Court’s decision would allow the President to remove, without cause, the heads of numerous independent agencies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Chemical Safety Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 

Trump v. Cook – the Federal Reserve exception

Cook presented the exception identified by the Court in Slaughter. In a five-to-four decision, with Chief Justice Roberts again writing for the majority, the Supreme Court denied the stay requested by the government. The majority held that the government was unlikely to succeed because the Federal Reserve falls within the class of entities created by Congress that do not exercise executive power, and thus the Constitution does not require that its members be subject to presidential removal at will. The majority opinion explained that the government’s arguments “would in effect transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment” and that doing so would be “an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from political interference.”

The majority opinion emphasized the Federal Reserve’s unique historical status and role. According to the majority, the Federal Reserve “operates at a deliberate remove from the ordinary political process,” and noted that “[n]ot only the fact of independence but also the appearance of independence is key to the Federal Reserve’s design.” The majority further explained that this “counsels a substantial threshold” for removal for cause, and that the “key issue is whether ‘[t]he cause assigned’ truly ‘impl[ies] an unfitness for the place’—or whether it simply represents an effort to secure a ‘more congenial’ replacement.”

The Supreme Court held that, under the statute’s for-cause protections, Governor Cook was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond before her removal (although not a full judicial trial). In denying the government’s application to stay the preliminary injunction, the Court understood the injunction to bar Governor Cook’s removal at this time, but not preventing the President from again attempting removal with proper process. The factual question of whether the alleged mortgage fraud constitutes adequate cause was left for further proceedings on remand.

Key takeaways 

• Humphrey’s Executor has been overruled. Heads of independent executive agencies that exercise executive power – such as rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudicatory powers – are now removable by the President at will, regardless of statutory for-cause protections.
  
  
• The decision has broad implications across agencies. The President may remove at will the leadership of agencies that exercise executive power. At agencies such as FERC, CPSC, NRC, and others identified in the dissent, existing for-cause removal protections may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.¹
  
  
• The Federal Reserve remains an exception. Cook confirms that Federal Reserve Governors retain for-cause removal protection consistent with Article II. Before removing a Federal Reserve Governor “for cause,” the President must provide notice and an opportunity to respond.
  
  
• Cook is an interim ruling, and the ultimate decision will be fact-specific. The Court’s ruling was limited to denying a stay application. It does not preclude the President from pursuing removal through a proper process that provides Governor Cook with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Whether the President can remove Cook “for cause” based on fraud allegations remains to be determined.
  
  
• Any change to Federal Reserve independence must come from Congress. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Cook emphasized that, if the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protections are to be eliminated, that change must occur through the legislative process rather than executive action.

Considerations for organizations

• Evaluate potential effects of changes in leadership. Changes in agency leadership may affect pending rulemakings, enforcement actions, adjudications, and consent orders. Organizations may wish to consider regulatory strategies that account for reduced continuity between presidential administrations and potential delays if removals of agency members stall action for lack of a quorum.
  
  
• Monitor agency-specific litigation developments. Going forward, lower courts will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether agencies fall within the scope of Slaughter’s rule. Entities regulated by agencies that may fall outside what the Supreme Court described as the “heartland of executive power” are encouraged to track this developing jurisprudence closely.
  
  
• Consider how congressional action could affect Federal Reserve governance. While the Supreme Court’s holding provides support for the Federal Reserve’s independence, legislative activity aimed at restructuring the Federal Reserve’s governance could affect that framework.
  
  
• Assess the implications for independent agencies. Slaughter may affect the degree to which leaders of independent agencies align with the President’s policy objectives. Enforcement priorities, policy direction, and regulatory posture may shift more significantly with changes in administration. 

For more information or to discuss how these decisions may affect your organization, please contact the authors.