Long-awaited DOJ guidance on white collar enforcement priorities and policies: Key takeaways

In his remarks at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference on May 12, 2025, the Head of the US Department of Justice (DOJ)’s Criminal Division, Matthew Galeotti, announced the following:

• A new White Collar Enforcement Plan
• A revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Disclosure Policy
• A revised Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program Policy, and
• New guidance on the selection of monitors.

This guidance follows a number of Executive Orders (EOs) and other memoranda from the DOJ, including (1) the February 10, 2025 EO pausing enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for 180 days, pending the release of new guidelines; and (2) Attorney General Pam Bondi’s February 5, 2025 memo directing DOJ resources to the Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), among other guidance.

The DOJ also has undergone many structural and policy changes, as have a number of other federal enforcement authorities, leaving many open questions as to the path of future criminal and regulatory enforcement under the Trump Administration.

These announcements from the Criminal Division, with over 1100 prosecutors and staff including the largest collection of DOJ white collar enforcement attorneys, answer many of these questions by providing some clarity on the Administration’s policies and priorities for criminal white collar enforcement, and will likely set the model for the US Attorneys’ offices around the country.

The guidance in these releases generally align with the Administration’s prior pronouncements and priorities, including President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda focusing on the interests of US businesses, holding individuals accountable for wrongdoing, and renewed incentives for companies to self-disclose potential criminal conduct to help the “Department devote its resources to investigating and prosecuting individual wrongdoers and the most egregious criminal scheme[s].”

The White Collar Enforcement Plan, which outlines the DOJ’s criminal enforcement priorities under President Trump’s second Administration, is guided by three tenets: focus, fairness, and efficiency. According to remarks by Galeotti, these tenets will “will focus the Criminal Division’s efforts on the most egregious white-collar crime to make our nation safer and more prosperous, vindicate victims’ rights, maximize the use of the Department’s resources, and provide fairness and transparency to individuals and companies alike.”

Focus: DOJ Criminal Division will prioritize investigating and prosecuting corporate crime in ten “high-impact areas.”

Under the White Collar Enforcement Plan, the DOJ Criminal Division will focus on “key threats to America,” including fraud perpetrated against US citizens as individuals, as taxpayers, and as recipients of government services; dishonest actors who take advantage of government and enrich themselves through waste, fraud, and abuse; and criminals who exploit the US monetary and financial system.

To this end, the Plan outlines ten “high-impact areas” the DOJ will prioritize for investigating and prosecuting white collar crimes:

1. Waste, fraud, and abuse, including healthcare fraud and federal program and procurement fraud

2. Trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion

3. Fraud perpetrated through variable interest entities (VIEs), including, but not limited to, offering fraud, “ramp and dumps,” elder fraud, securities fraud, and other market manipulation schemes

4. Fraud that victimizes US investors, individuals, and markets including, but not limited to, Ponzi schemes, investment fraud, elder fraud, servicemember fraud, and fraud that threatens the health and safety of consumers

5. Conduct that threatens the country’s national security, including threats to the US financial system by gatekeepers, such as financial institutions and their insiders that commit sanctions violations or enable transactions by cartels, TCOs, hostile nation-states, and/or foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)

6. Material support by corporations to FTOs, including recently designated cartels and TCOs

7. Complex money laundering

8. Violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), including activities related to fentanyl production and unlawful distribution of opioids by medical professionals and companies

9. Bribery and associated money laundering that impact US national interests, undermine US national security, harm the competitiveness of US businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials; and

10. Digital asset-related crimes, including ones that (1) victimize investors and consumers; (2) use digital assets in furtherance of other criminal conduct; and (3) involve willful violations that facilitate significant criminal activity.

The Plan also instructs prosecutors to “prioritize efforts to identify and seize assets” related to criminal offenses to compensate victims, with focus on forfeiture actions related to conduct involving senior-level personnel or other culpable actors, demonstrable loss, and efforts to obstruct justice.

To align forfeiture proceedings with the DOJ’s high-impact areas for criminal enforcement, the DOJ has also revised the Criminal Division’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the Whistleblower Program) to add the following additional “Subject Areas” to Section II.3, which sets forth specific subject matter areas that a tip must pertain to in order to qualify for a whistleblower award:

1. Violations by corporations related to cartels or TCOs, including money laundering, narcotics, the Controlled Substances Act, and other violations

2. Violations by corporations of federal immigration law

3. Violations by corporations involving material support of terrorism

4. Corporate sanctions offenses

5. Trade, tariff, and customs fraud by corporations

6. Corporate procurement fraud

The prior version of the Whistleblower Program limited awards to information related to violations by financial institutions; violations under bribery, corruption, and money laundering statutes; and violations related to federal healthcare-related offenses and crimes. Language for some of these “subject matter areas” was simplified, and the additional areas above were added. Otherwise, the Whistleblower Program remains largely unchanged and remains an important area for companies considering their enforcement risk and the effectiveness of their compliance programs.

Takeaways

• Together, these high-impact areas closely align with the Trump Administration’s previous pronouncements regarding the scope and focus of DOJ enforcement priorities and emphasize an enforcement framework designed to address offenses perpetrated against or that otherwise harm US government programs, US investors, the US economy, US competitiveness, and US national security. In particular, non-US companies could be at heightened enforcement risk and could face criminal investigations into conduct not previously considered to be a significant enforcement risk.
  
  
• The high-impact areas above are not exclusive, meaning that criminal offenses not listed among these high-impact areas can still be investigated and prosecuted. However, the bulk of DOJ resources, including prosecutors and law enforcement agents, will be dedicated to matters that involve these high-impact areas as a first priority.
  
  
• The DOJ will continue to use its full range of statutory mechanisms to address these priorities, including statutes like the FCPA, whose future was uncertain.
  
  
• Enforcement actions focused on sanctions violations, including but not limited to sanctions violations involving cartels and TCOs, are likely to significantly increase. The combination of these being included as high-impact areas, combined with Attorney General Bondi’s February 5, 2025 memo (which suspended Main Justice’s approval requirements for these cases) will further incentivize US Attorneys throughout the country to build and charge these cases.
  
  
• A surge of whistleblower complaints is also expected within the six new subject areas not previously part of the Whistleblower Program. The Criminal Division’s Whistleblower Program has been up and running for several months, fielding complaints and making actionable referrals to the field in coordination with other law enforcement agencies. Companies are encouraged to ensure that they have thoroughly addressed issues identified in previous hotline reports.

Fairness: The DOJ Criminal Division’s amended Corporate Enforcement Policy aims to provide more transparency and enhanced incentives to companies that self-disclose and cooperate.

Although the White Collar Enforcement Plan establishes that the DOJ’s “first priority is to prosecute individual criminals” and “investigate these individual wrongdoers relentlessly to hold them accountable,” it also emphasizes that it is “critical to American prosperity to promote policies that acknowledge law-abiding companies and companies that are willing to learn from their mistakes and provide those companies with transparency from the Department.”

To this effect, the DOJ has revised its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Disclosure Policy (the CEP) to be as “transparent as we can to companies and their counsel about what to expect.”

The CEP’s revisions could realign the incentive structure in ways that could impact a company’s analysis, potentially making it more likely that companies, including those presented with aggravating factors, will decide to make a voluntary self-disclosure.

The most significant change is the revised CEP’s use of more streamlined language and a new Appendix A to visualize three clear paths to potential resolutions of corporate criminal misconduct: the declination path, the non-prosecution agreement (NPA) path, and a third path capturing other resolutions requiring prosecutorial discretion.

These three paths provide for clear routes to resolution that companies can expect to achieve so long as the requirements for each are satisfied. These formalized paths contrast to the prior CEP, which merely set forth “presumptions” of declinations or non-prosecutions if the same elements were met.

Although these paths appear aimed at removing uncertainty associated with perceived prosecutorial discretion, Criminal Division prosecutors are expected to conduct a case-by-case analysis and can wield discretion to determine the appropriate path, penalty, and term based upon the particular circumstances of the case.

• Path I - Declinations: The Criminal Division will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct when:

1. The company voluntarily self-disclosed the misconduct to the Criminal Division

2. The company fully cooperated with the Criminal Division’s investigation

3. The company timely and appropriately remediated the misconduct, and

4. There are no aggravating circumstances related to the nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company, severity of harm caused by the misconduct, or criminal adjudication or resolution within the last five years based on similar misconduct by the entity engaged in the current misconduct.

In addition to that path that provides greater certainty, companies that voluntary self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate – but have potentially aggravating circumstances – may still be eligible for a declination “based on weighing the severity of those aggravating circumstances and the company’s cooperation and remediation.” The primary change under these circumstances is the elimination of the requirement for companies to pay disgorgement or forfeiture relating to the misconduct at issue, which could be a significant factor in cases with large economic gains.

• Path II - Non-prosecution agreements: Companies that are not eligible for a declination because their self-report did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure or the conduct involved aggravating factors will receive an NPA so long as the company has:

1. Fully cooperated

2. Timely and appropriately remediated, and

3. There are no other particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances.

The CEP provides that, if these circumstances are met, the NPA term should be fewer than three years, should not require an independent compliance monitor, and applicable fines should reflect a 75-percent reduction off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) fine range. These parameters are not significantly different from the previous CEP effective under the Biden Administration’s DOJ, although they formalize this “middle ground” for an NPA if a company does not fully satisfy the requirements for a declination and establishes clear boundaries for reduced NPA term lengths, compliance obligations, and penalty reductions.

• Path III - Other resolutions: If a company is not eligible for a declination or NPA as set forth above, the CEP preserves prosecutorial discretion for determining the appropriate resolution form, length, compliance obligations, and monetary penalty, which can include potential penalty reductions up to 50 percent off the low end of the USSG fine range. Even if a company does not self-report, fully cooperate, or timely and appropriately remediate, prosecutors could still find that a 50-percent penalty reduction is warranted, depending on the circumstances of the case. These alternatives remain largely unchanged from the CEP in place under the Biden Administration’s DOJ.

Consistent with the prior DOJ guidance in the earlier versions of the CEP, corporate resolutions must take into account the severity of the misconduct, the company’s degree of cooperation and remediation, and the effectiveness of the company’s compliance program at both the time of the misconduct and the time of resolution. For all of the above paths, Criminal Division prosecutors must still conduct individualized assessments to determine the appropriate disposition in any given matter. As part of those individualized assessments, the CEP’s definitions and requirements for “voluntary self-disclosures,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate remediation” remain largely unchanged. The revised CEP modifies the definition of a “voluntary self-disclosure” somewhat by eliminating the broad requirement for companies to disclose “all relevant, non-privileged facts known” to qualify for a voluntary self-disclosure, but incorporates that requirement instead into determining whether a company has fully cooperated.

In the near term, the Criminal Division is reviewing the length and term of all existing corporate resolutions “to determine if they should be terminated early,” consistent with the revised CEP. A number of agreements have already been terminated early, with factors including duration of the post-resolution period, substantial reductions in the company’s risk profile, extent of remediation, maturity of the corporate compliance program, and whether the company self-reported the misconduct.

Takeaways

• Galeotti emphasized that the primary message companies should take from the revised CEP is: “Self-disclosure is key to receiving the most generous benefits the Criminal Division can offer.” Companies are encouraged to carefully examine whether there may be an opportunity to clean out their existing inventory of historical cases in this more lenient corporate enforcement environment.
  
  
• The requirements for declinations or NPAs – including the definitions for a “voluntary self-disclosure,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate remediation” – remain largely unchanged.
  
  
• Penalty presumptions remain unchanged, but the White Collar Enforcement Plan establishes that corporate resolution terms should not be longer than three years, except in exceedingly rare cases. Consistent with the revised CEP, the Criminal Division is reviewing active agreements to determine if they should be terminated early.
  
  
• Prompt identification and remediation of misconduct continues to be a critical precursor of reaching a more favorable resolution, including a declination.

Efficiency: DOJ Criminal Division commits to streamlining corporate investigations.

In its White Collar Enforcement Plan, the DOJ highlights the significant costs and disruption federal investigations cause for businesses, investors, and stakeholders, “many of whom have no knowledge of, or involvement in, the misconduct at issue.” This includes reputational harm that “may at times be unwarranted.” To address this concern, the Criminal Division is adopting two key policy changes:

1. “Prosecutors must take all reasonable steps to minimize the length and collateral impact of their investigations, and to ensure that bad actors are brought to justice swiftly and resources are marshaled efficiently,” while still recognizing that the criminal schemes it investigates are “complex and often cross borders” and may require significant time to complete.

2. “Independent compliance monitors must only be imposed when they are necessary” and “must be narrowly tailored to achieve the necessary goals while minimizing expense, burden, and interference with the business.”

The newly issued Memorandum on Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters details the factors that prosecutors must consider when deciding if a monitor is appropriate and steps to ensure a properly tailored scope of the monitor’s “mandate.” Factors that must be considered before imposing a monitor include:

• The risk of recurrence of the criminal conduct that significantly impacts US interests: The DOJ highlights a wide range of conduct that may impact US interests – which largely overlaps with the high-impact areas – including national security offenses such as sanctions evasion; foreign bribery; trade fraud and tariff evasion; procurement and healthcare fraud; and crimes that facilitate cartels, TCOs, narcotics trafficking, and material support for FTOs.
  
  
• Availability and efficacy of other independent government oversight: If a primary regulator can provide effective oversight (eg, the US Food and Drug Administration, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the US Securities and Exchange Commission), a monitor may not be necessary, whereas a history of criminal conduct despite that regulator’s supervision may support imposition of a monitor.
  
  
• Efficacy of the compliance program and culture of compliance at the time of the resolution: Prosecutors must consider whether a monitor is necessary in light of actions taken by the company to prevent further misconduct, including: changes in leadership or the compliance environment within the company; self-directed enhancements to the company’s compliance program; the engagement of “consultants, auditors and other experts”; and actions taken “against employees involve in and/or had supervisory responsibility for those involved in the misconduct.”
  
  
• Maturity of the company’s controls and its ability to independently test and update its compliance program: Prosecutors must consider whether a company has a compliance program and system of internal controls that are sufficient to “detect and prevent similar misconduct in the future.” This includes assessing how the company is measuring and testing its compliance program and whether the company has the capacity to test its program.

To ensure a monitorship is “appropriately tailored and focused,” the monitorship is required to be proportionate to the conduct and the size and risk profile of the company; there must be at least biannual tri-partite meetings between the company, monitor, and government; and the monitorship “should be a collaborative endeavor” involving “ongoing and open dialogue” between the DOJ, the monitor, and the company. This does not appear to significantly depart from more recent monitorship practices, but it could help discourage more adversarial monitorship relationships.

The DOJ is currently reviewing all existing monitorships in an effort to, according to Galeotti, “narrow their scope or, where appropriate, terminate a monitorship altogether, based on a totality of the circumstances review.” To date, this review has resulted in at least several early terminations that have been announced publicly.

Takeaways

• The impact of the emphasis on efficiency will remain to be seen and is likely to depend on the amount of investigation activity initiated by the DOJ and the resources available within it to support those investigations. The shifting of white collar prosecutorial resources to less typical enforcement areas could hamper efforts at efficiency and shift more work to companies with less independent investigation by the DOJ. Companies could see more active requests for information and expectations for shorter timelines to provide responses.
  
  
• The monitor guidance makes clear that the DOJ will continue to look at the effectiveness of any remediation undertaken by a company and the effectiveness of the compliance program at the time of resolution, including the state of the company’s compliance program testing and monitoring capabilities. This further reinforces the strategy of ensuring a compliance enhancement strategy both proactively prior to an investigation (if possible) and at the beginning of an investigation, rather than as the company is moving towards resolution. The DOJ’s expectation that companies adopt reasonably designed and tested compliance programs should include an appropriately designed testing and monitoring program that will have sufficient time to be implemented and tested to measure effectiveness.
  
  
• The new monitor guidance references existing Criminal Division Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs guidance, so there is no indication at this time that the DOJ is changing its approach to evaluating corporate compliance programs or that companies can redirect their focus from their compliance programs. In fact, doing so could limit their ability to obtain a declination and avoid costly post-resolution monitor obligations.
  
  
• While the new monitor guidance suggests imposition of a monitor may become less common, an evolution in the design of monitorship structures could also occur, imposing less burdensome approaches rather than a net reduction in monitorships.

Conclusion

DOJ’s Criminal Division’s newly announced White Collar Enforcement Plan and related polices and guidance reinforce the second Trump Administration’s focus on “America First” economic principles and a reformulated enforcement strategy that aligns with the new policy agenda.

Given the variety of new ways that historical laws may be enforced, companies (especially non-US companies) are encouraged to map out how their business operations overlap with these new enforcement risks and whether their compliance programs and internal controls can effectively manage this new world of white collar enforcement.

DLA Piper will be diving into further details on many of these key areas in the weeks to come and analyzing how these new DOJ policies may impact companies’ compliance priorities, investigative strategies, and posture with enforcement agencies (in the US and around the world).

DLA Piper’s cross-practice, cross-border team has deep expertise and experience in the DOJ’s areas of focus. For more information about how the White Collar Enforcement Plan may impact your business, please contact any of the authors or your DLA relationship attorney.