Supreme Court simplifies personal jurisdiction requirements under the FSIA

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declining to enforce a $1.3 billion arbitral award against an Indian state instrumentality for lack of personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.

In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed decades-old Ninth Circuit precedent that introduced a non-statutory minimum contacts requirement into the FSIA’s personal jurisdiction analysis and made the Ninth Circuit an outlier among the federal courts of appeals, the majority of which had found no minimum contacts were required to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state.

This alert discusses the courts’ analyses and provides key takeaways from the Supreme Court’s decision.

Background

The case, Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp.,[1] arose out of a dispute between Devas, an Indian company that signed a satellite leasing agreement with Antrix, a subdivision of India’s Department of Space, pursuant to which Antrix was to build and launch a new satellite network from which Devas would lease a portion of the satellite capacity to provide telecommunications services across India.

After Antrix unexpectedly terminated the agreement, citing force majeure, Devas initiated arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal found in favor of Devas – concluding that Antrix improperly terminated the agreement – and awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages, plus interest. Devas sought to confirm the award before the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in 2018, arguing that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to the arbitration exception to the FSIA.[2]

Ninth Circuit’s analysis

The district court confirmed the arbitral award and entered a $1.3 billion judgment against Antrix. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that there was no proper basis for personal jurisdiction over Antrix.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused on Section 1330(b) of the FSIA, which provides that personal jurisdiction “shall exist” where (1) there is subject matter jurisdiction because one of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions applies and (2) there is proper service of process.[3] However, the Ninth Circuit had previously held that a sovereign defendant must also have “minimum contacts” with the forum to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Section 1330(b) of the FSIA. Specifically, in Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F. 2d 1247, 1255 (1980), the Ninth Circuit had determined that the structure and legislative history of the FSIA provided strong evidence that the jurisdictional framework provided by the FSIA was intended to incorporate a minimum contacts requirement.[4]

After conducting a minimum contacts analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Antrix lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the United States and dismissed the case.

Supreme Court’s decision

In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that personal jurisdiction is “automatic” where an immunity exception applies (which establishes subject matter jurisdiction) and service of process has been effected.[5] Put simply, “subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.”[6]

The Supreme Court rejected the “strange statutory argument” the Ninth Circuit had embraced through Gonzalez, which had imposed the additional “minimum contacts” requirement based on language found in just one of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions. The Court held that “nothing in the text of [FSIA] §1330(b) requires a minimum-contacts analysis,” and “decline[d] to add in what Congress left out.”[7]

The Supreme Court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment of the structure of the FSIA, explaining that due process in exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign state is already embodied in the structure of the FSIA without the need to engraft an additional minimum contacts requirement onto the jurisdictional analysis. The Court observed that Congress intentionally tied together the immunity and jurisdictional provisions in the FSIA by collapsing subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and service of process into one inquiry.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s holding is clear: Personal jurisdiction exists under Section 1330(b) of the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service of process is proper.[8]

Antrix made a number of alternative arguments, including that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause required a showing of minimum contacts before a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, Devas’s claims did not fall within the arbitration exception to the FSIA, and that the suit should be dismissed under forum non conveniens. Because those arguments were not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court declined to address them as well. However, Antrix may raise these arguments on remand.

For more information, please contact the authors.

 

^{[1] CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2025 WL 1583292, (U.S. June 5, 2025) (23-1201 CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. (06/05/2025)).}

^{[2] See 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(6).}

^{[3] 28 U. S. C. §1330(b).}

^{[4] Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980); see also H.Rep. No. 54-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at pp. 6604, 6612, describing § 1330(b).}

^{[5] Devas v. Antrix, 2025 WL 1583292, at *5.}

^{[6] Id. (citing GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Auth., 680 F. 3d 805, 811 (CADC 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).}

^{[7] Devas v. Antrix, 2025 WL 1583292, at *5.}

^{[8] Id. at *7.}