SHE Matters: R W Wood Treatment Limited

On 17 July 2015 a huge explosion occurred at Bosley Mill in Cheshire, destroying the mill which dates back to the 18th century. Four people died as a result, with the body of one never being recovered. Many others were injured.

The works had originally been constructed to process copper and brass but had been converted for various purposes during its history and reopened to grind wood into a fine flour as the basis for wood products. At the time of the explosion, it was being operated by Wood Treatment Limited to manufacture a variety of wood fibre and wood powder products.

Wood flour is highly explosive, and it appears that health and safety management at site was lacking. The severity of the explosion made the ensuing investigation by Cheshire Police, HSE and Cheshire Fire and Rescue very difficult. However, following its conclusion, Wood Treatment Limited was charged with four counts of corporate manslaughter, its managing director with four counts of manslaughter by reason of gross negligence, and the company and two of its managers were charged with offences under the Health and Safety etc at Work Act 1974.

Wood Treatment Limited pleaded guilty to an offence under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act (employer’s general duty to ensure health, safety and welfare of employees at work) but the other counts went to trial.

At the close of the prosecution case the judge at the Crown Court accepted a submission by the defence of no case to answer on the counts relating to corporate manslaughter and manslaughter by gross negligence.

That was because the investigation had concluded that it was not possible to show what event had caused the explosion. There were four likely scenarios considered by the two expert witnesses who appeared for the prosecution. Three of these scenarios were only consistent with some degree of negligence by the defendant company and its managing director. Scenarios 1, 2 and 4 relied on evidence that there were considerable accumulations of dust in the mill which were not adequately cleaned, and that leaks from poorly designed and maintained machinery had also produced dust. Crucially, however, one of the four scenarios, Scenario 3, which was accepted by one of the expert witnesses as a “highly credible” possible cause of the explosion, involved a large release from a piece of equipment within the mill, a sifting machine which had just been brought back into use following repair. The large release in this scenario led to settled dust, and an explosive cloud which was then ignited by chance and this levitated the released dust into the explosion without a secondary explosion.

As this scenario was presented by the prosecution witnesses, it did not necessarily involve a breach of duty by either the corporate defendant or its managing director which had caused the four deaths.

Even on that scenario, there might have been evidence to go to the jury on the relevant counts if there had also been evidence that the release could only have occurred if machinery had not been properly maintained or treated, but the Crown failed to advance such evidence.

Accordingly, the Crown Court judge accepted the defence submissions that the jury would be unable to rule out a possible cause which was consistent with the innocence of the accused.

That ruling is what is termed a terminating ruling, and the prosecution appealed against it under section 58 Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The appeal

The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division very speedily at the end of April 2021, despite, or perhaps because of, the pandemic. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s ruling that in these circumstances the counts relating to corporate manslaughter and manslaughter by gross negligence had to be withdrawn from the jury. Accordingly, Wood Treatment Limited and Mr B, its managing director, had to be acquitted on those four counts.

The Court of Appeal followed an earlier case, R v Broughton, where a conviction for manslaughter was quashed. In that case, a young man had failed to ensure that medical assistance was given to a young woman to whom he had given a cocktail of drugs at a music festival. The evidence for the prosecution alleged gross negligence in failing to secure the necessary medical treatment. However, the evidence had also shown that there was a realistic, if only 10%, chance that the woman would have died in any event. Accordingly, no jury could have been sure that the negligence on the part of the defendant had actually caused the death.

The court took the view that whereas in some civil cases such as those relating to mesothelioma (caused by exposure to asbestos fibres), the rules on causation could and should be relaxed, that would not be appropriate in criminal cases.

Following the ruling in the Court of Appeal, Wood Treatment Limited were fined GBP75,000, having pleaded guilty to the offence under section 2 HSWA. Mr B, who was charged in relation to that breach under section 37 of the Act was fined GBP12,000 and disqualified from being a director for four years.

The two other managers were acquitted, but this appears to have been on the basis of arguments put forward by the defence that it could not be shown that they individually had sufficient responsibility in relation to the management of the business at Bosley Mill, or of a significant part of it, to be properly regarded as a “Director, Manager, Secretary or similar officer” of the company for the purposes of a charge under section 37 of the Act.

Why this case is important

The case highlights the point that, in order to obtain a conviction of a corporate entity for corporate manslaughter, or an individual for manslaughter by reason of gross negligence, it is necessary to prove that the defendant’s breach of duty caused the deaths. By contrast, it is not necessary to prove any results caused by breach of duty to secure a conviction for a breach of one of the general duties under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, such as those under sections 2 and 3 of the Act. The prosecution therefore face a somewhat harder task in order to secure a greater return in terms of the potential sentence which might be imposed on the defendant if convicted. (Prosecutors are often, however, under pressure to pursue the more serious homicide charges where there is a fatal outcome, out of consideration for the families of the deceased.)

It should also be noted that had the prosecution been more alive to the vulnerability of their case before witnesses gave evidence, it might not have been very difficult to adduce evidence to suggest fault on the part of the defendant in relation to all of the possible scenarios. No doubt in future prosecutors can be expected to be more careful in that regard.