DOJ announces accelerated review of qui tam actions: Key points

Consistent with a prior Executive Order titled “Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud,” on May 27, 2026, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it is fast-tracking, “to the maximum extent practicable,” the timeline for investigating and making intervention decisions in qui tam actions alleging fraud on federally funded benefits programs (benefits fraud) in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA).

In an internal memorandum to DOJ Fraud Section attorneys and Assistant US Attorneys handling FCA cases (Shumate Memo), Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate outlined an accelerated review track for new “benefits fraud” qui tam complaints in which DOJ will complete its review of such actions within 60 to “no later than” 120 days, and determine whether the complaint should proceed, be dismissed, or requires further government investigation.

The Shumate Memo also states that DOJ will handle new qui tam actions using a “whole-of-government approach” that leverages other divisions beyond the Civil Fraud Section to simultaneously pursue potential criminal violations and administrative actions arising from the qui tam complaint. Although the precise scope and details are unclear, the Shumate Memo may have significant implications for the government, whistleblowers, and defendants.

Overview of qui tam actions

Qui tam lawsuits allow private individuals or entities with knowledge of fraud against the federal government, often referred to as whistleblowers or “relators,” to file a lawsuit on the government’s behalf, under seal. (The phrase qui tam is shorthand for an old Latin term meaning “He who sues for the King as well as himself”). Most FCA cases begin as qui tam actions. After a relator files a qui tam lawsuit under seal and provides DOJ with relevant disclosures, DOJ must conduct an investigation and review the evidence to decide whether to intervene in the action and take control of the litigation. If it does, the government will pursue the case in partnership with the relator. If DOJ declines to intervene, the relator may continue the lawsuit independently, although the United States remains the real party in interest. Although this qui tam mechanism has come under direct constitutional challenge (as discussed here and here), it remains a primary FCA enforcement mechanism.

If the case is successful through a settlement or a trial resolution, the statute requires the relator to receive between 15 and 30 percent of amounts collected by the government. According to DOJ, 1,297 qui tam actions were filed in 2025, with settlements and judgments exceeding USD5.3 billion, representing nearly 80 percent of the total FCA recoveries that year. In its press release announcing the Shumate Memo, DOJ’s Civil Division highlighted the FCA as “one of the government’s most powerful weapons for fighting fraud and protecting taxpayer dollars” and explained that reforms to FCA qui tam review will allow DOJ to “maximize finite enforcement resources, and focus on dismantling sophisticated fraud schemes that exploit taxpayer-funded programs.”

The Shumate Memo’s impact on qui tam actions

The Shumate Memo appears to change DOJ’s approach to qui tam review and enforcement in several ways:

Benefits fraud. The Shumate Memo’s scope is not entirely clear, although it specifically addresses “benefits fraud.” Although the term is not explicitly defined, the Shumate Memo states that DOJ is addressing “fraud on federally funded benefits programs administered by the states (benefits fraud).” The apparent limitation of state-administered benefits is notable because that seems to exclude cases involving Medicare, which is administered federally and is often the subject of significant FCA cases. But many federal programs are administered by the states, such as Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and housing assistance programs.

Expedited review. The Shumate Memo departs from historical practice by imposing an expectation that DOJ will complete its review of relevant qui tam actions within 60 to 120 days. Although the qui tam statute includes a 60-day time limit for DOJ investigation, DOJ routinely seeks and receives extensions, resulting in cases remaining under seal for more than two years – and sometimes longer. According to the stated aims of the Shumate Memo, at the conclusion of its expedited 60–120-day review, DOJ must choose one of three options:

• DOJ will “permit the relator to proceed with the action and to assume primary responsibility for litigating it, subject to the government’s ongoing supervision and ultimate control of the matter”
  
  
• DOJ could conclude that further government investigation is needed
  
  
• DOJ could conclude that the action should be affirmatively dismissed for lack of factual specificity or legal deficiency

This acceleration and prioritization may permit DOJ “to concentrate its efforts on dismantling and holding accountable sophisticated actors that are responsible for the largest, most complex, and harmful fraud schemes.” This aspect of the new approach could “increase the number of benefits fraud matters primarily litigated by relators,” but in the same sentence the Shumate Memo also asserts that DOJ “nonetheless expects” that it “will continue to assume primary responsibility for investigating and pursuing the majority of incoming qui tam matters.”

The explicit directive to consider and pursue affirmative dismissals may be designed to prevent meritless suits, but how effectively DOJ can perform that gatekeeping function on this timeline remains to be seen – particularly in more complex matters.

Guidance on factors. The Shumate Memo also provides further guidance and specificity on factors that will guide DOJ’s determination “that the relator should promptly proceed to litigate” the qui tam action. The Shumate Memo identifies the following non-exhaustive considerations for allowing the relator to take the lead:

• The complaint alleges conduct that would constitute a violation of the FCA
  
  
• The complaint alleges facts that can be corroborated by “available information, including data analytics, agency information, or the relator’s inside information”[1]
  
  
• The case implicates a scheme or “course of misconduct” that is “not novel or complex”
  
  
• The amount of potential damages is below USD10 million
  
  
• Aggravating factors, such as beneficiary harm, ongoing misuse of federal funds, or concealment or deceit by the defendant, are present

Guidance on further investigation. The Shumate Memo also expands upon when further government investigation of a benefits fraud qui tam complaint is appropriate, outlining pillars for the expedited 120-day timeline of its investigation (Investigative Period):

• Investigative plan: DOJ attorneys develop an investigative plan containing a schedule for prompt issuance of subpoenas, initial witness interviews, and/or a Civil Investigative Demand (CID).
  
  
• Use of targeted requests for information: Requests for information under the investigation will be tailored, and early witness interviews and/or oral examinations will be considered as potential alternatives to production requests for certain categories of documents to avoid disrupting a potentially covert investigation.
  
  
• Appropriate use of subpoenas and CID enforcement: Defendants will be provided a “definitive timeframe” to respond to subpoenas and CIDs and, if the defendant fails to meet it, action will be taken to enforce the request (absent a justifiable reason for the failure).
  
  
• Assistance of relator’s counsel: DOJ will leverage relator’s counsel when appropriate, requesting assistance with the investigation as warranted.
  
  
• Possible refinement of damages estimates during discovery: If the government’s investigation is prolonged to develop a detailed assessment of possible damages and a settlement appears unlikely, DOJ may intervene based on evidence of liability and general parameters of the government’s loss, with damages to be amended or refined during discovery.
  
  
• Additional investigative time: DOJ attorneys will assess the case for an election decision (to intervene or not; to permit the relator to proceed; or to move to dismiss) at the expiration of the Investigative Period. However, if more time is needed to complete the investigation, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Commercial Litigation Branch may grant an additional 120 days. Beyond that, subsequent extensions are still possible but must be approved by the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division.

Finally, the Shumate Memo states that DOJ will approach new benefits fraud qui tam actions with a “whole-of-government approach” to ensure that fraud cases not only receive review on the accelerated track, but that they are properly evaluated for all available enforcement avenues – including criminal and administrative action, presumably including debarment proceedings.

In particular, DOJ will refer all new matters to:

• The Criminal Division and/or the new National Fraud Enforcement Division for potential criminal violations
  
  
• The affected agency to evaluate potential administrative actions, such as payment suspension
  
  
• The affected agency for evidence of the relator’s allegations and insight into how the impacted government program was affected by the alleged benefits fraud

Key takeaways

• The scope of the Shumate Memo is unclear. Qui tam review and enforcement will need to be closely monitored in the coming months to assess where and how DOJ applies these reforms.
  
  
• The new expedited review timeline will challenge the government and litigants, especially when the facts and relevant rules, regulations, and laws are complex, as they often are in healthcare or multifaceted benefits programs. In addition, identifying, collecting, producing, and analyzing large volumes of documents and data could be difficult in the 60–120-day timeline.
  
  
• Although relators may be litigating more cases, the USD10 million limit and the apparent exclusion of Medicare cases generally may indicate that the government will seek to handle the high-value cases.
  
  
• Increased reliance on relators is consistent with recent trends, including the role of data miners, litigation funders, and others. Historically, non-intervened cases have been less likely to result in recovery.
  
  
• The automatic referral of FCA cases for criminal assessment may complicate investigation decisions for both DOJ and entities under investigation. For example, the decision to provide testimony in a civil proceeding may become more complex when there is a potential for a criminal investigation.

Learn more

For more information on the announcement’s implications for your business and how DLA Piper can help determine the ramifications in applicable situations, please contact any of the authors.

[1] The reference to “data analytics” continues DOJ’s focus on the role “data mining” has played in FCA litigation in recent years, discussed previously here.