Competition Bureau closes investigation into RealPage and Yardi, but algorithmic pricing remains under the microscope

The Competition Bureau has closed its civil investigation into RealPage and Yardi’s use of algorithm-driven pricing tools in Canada’s rental housing market.

While the probe is over, the Bureau also issued a position statement reinforcing its view that algorithmic pricing software can pose significant risks to competition. The statement underscores the Bureau’s ongoing enforcement focus on the intersection of data, algorithms, and anticompetitive conduct.

In short, market participants should expect continued scrutiny of property technology, real-time data utilities, and digital tools that can align rival strategies—not just in housing, but across sectors where capacity, pricing, and inventory optimization are digitized and intermediated.

For businesses in most industries, the statement also serves as helpful guidance on deploying algorithmic or AI-based pricing tools without breaching the Competition Act. While Bureau guidance is not binding law, it offers valuable insight into enforcement priorities—in this case, a sustained focus on algorithmic pricing and data-driven coordination—and thus provides a strong foundation for compliance strategies.

Context and legal framework

To the Bureau, algorithmic pricing software raises particular concerns under sections 90.1 and 79 of the Competition Act.

Section 90.1—the civil agreements provision—addresses agreements between competitors (or potential competitors) that substantially prevent or lessen competition. Even where the parties are not competitors, the provision applies where a “significant purpose” of all or part of the agreement is to lessen or prevent competition. Unlike the Act’s per se criminal conspiracy offence in section 45, section 90.1 is effects-based, focusing on market definition, the nature of coordination, and competitive impact. In practice, the Bureau conducts a forward-looking assessment of whether the conduct is likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, drawing on market facts to infer effects on price, output, quality, and innovation. Section 90.1 does not require proof that the parties expressly agreed to raise prices or that harm has already occurred; the likely effects of the agreement, supported by evidence on incentives, market structure, and the software’s design and adoption, can be sufficient. Indeed, the Bureau’s statement touches on how information exchanges—particularly when facilitated or centralized by a third-party vendor—can function as a mechanism of coordination even absent explicit price-fixing, and how algorithmic tools may align pricing or revenue management decisions among independent landlords.

The Bureau reiterates that the presence of a common vendor or platform does not automatically trigger a contravention of section 90.1. The central questions remain (i) whether the software’s design, configuration, data flows, and governance facilitate agreements or concerted practices that soften rivalry, and (ii) whether the resultant effects reach the statutory threshold of a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. Indeed, in the RealPage and Yardi investigation, the Bureau could not substantiate the second element: “given the relatively low adoption of revenue management software” in Canada, it was “unable to demonstrate such substantial harm”.

Section 79—abuse of dominance—occurs where a dominant firm (or firms) carries out anti-competitive acts or engages in conduct that substantially harms competition in a market. In the RealPage and Yardi case, for example, the Bureau considered whether the parties held a dominant position in the market for revenue management software or rental housing, and examined the effects and intent of three “buckets of conduct”: the collection and commingling of non‑public, competitively sensitive landlord data to generate price recommendations; the use of algorithmic rules that could artificially inflate recommended rents; and incentives or barriers that drive high adherence to, or deter rejection of, recommended prices.  The policy statement notes that the Bureau discontinued this line of its investigation into Yardi and RealPage after it could not “conclude that either firm occupied a dominant position”.

Key takeaways from the position statement

The Bureau ended its review of RealPage and Yardi’s algorithmic pricing, citing insufficient evidence of abuse of dominance or anticompetitive conduct.

However, it remains concerned about the potential impact of such tools on competition in the multi-family rental market. The policy statement highlights several key themes that businesses can take away in that regard:

• First, algorithmic pricing and revenue management solutions can raise competition issues where they directly or indirectly enable alignment across competing landlords. The Bureau flags risks when tools nudge or constrain pricing choices, impose common parameters, or standardize responses to market conditions in ways that materially reduce independent decision-making.
• Second, centralized or reciprocal exchanges of competitively sensitive information—such as current or future rents, occupancy targets, concessions, and lease-up strategies—are a focal point. Where vendors collect, normalize, and disseminate such data with sufficient granularity and timeliness, those flows may operate as a conduit for coordinated outcomes, particularly in concentrated submarkets.
• Third, vendor design choices matter. The Bureau’s analysis looks beyond contractual labels to the actual function of features, defaults, and recommended workflows. Embedded settings, benchmarking dashboards, optimization constraints, and cross-client analytics can all be relevant to whether a “meeting of minds” or a concerted practice is inferred.
• Fourth, effects are assessed in context. The Bureau points to market structure, concentration at the local level, switching costs, and the prevalence of the software across competitors as relevant factors in assessing whether any alignment would substantially lessen or prevent competition.
• Fifth, the Bureau remains willing to pursue civil competitor collaboration theories in digital markets outside traditional per se cartel cases, and to scrutinize both the vendors and the adoption practices of their customers.

Implications for landlords, property managers, and software vendors

For landlords and managers, the statement serves as a reminder that outsourcing pricing analytics does not outsource antitrust or competition law risk. Organizations that use revenue management or dynamic pricing tools should ensure that human oversight remains meaningful and that decision-making retains independence. Where the tool generates recommendations informed by rivals’ data, users should be able to identify inputs, exercise discretion, and document rationales for departures or acceptance of recommendations.

Further, contracts with software vendors should address data access, data granularity, and use restrictions, and establish guardrails to prevent the exchange of competitively sensitive information among rivals. Configuration should disable or strictly control features that could facilitate real-time, property-level visibility into rivals’ price or capacity intentions. Internal governance should ensure that staff do not treat vendor-derived benchmarks as a proxy for market agreements.

For software vendors, the Bureau’s statement signals that they should assess whether defaults or “recommended” settings function as de facto coordination mechanisms, and whether client-level controls and audit logs are sufficiently robust to demonstrate independent use.

For investor-owners and asset managers, diligence should now consider competition risks. Wide adoption of the same revenue management tool across markets with few large landlords can amplify exposure, particularly if local concentration is high and cross-portfolio analytics are enabled.

Practical steps to reduce risk

Organizations operating in the multi-residential sector can translate the Bureau’s guidance into practical controls that preserve the benefits of analytics while mitigating enforcement risk:

• Evaluate the external data used for pricing, and insist on aggregation and meaningful time delays for any competitor-derived inputs.
• Require that algorithmic tools offer adjustable parameters and the ability to opt out of “recommended” strategies, with documentation of independent judgments.
• Implement contractual and technical restrictions that prevent the sharing or receipt of rivals’ current or forward-looking pricing and occupancy information at the property level.
• Train revenue and leasing teams on permissible benchmarking versus prohibited exchanges, emphasizing that vendor dashboards are not a safe harbour if they reveal non-public, sensitive competitor data.
• Maintain governance records —policies, configurations, vendor diligence records, and oversight committee minutes—to demonstrate a culture of compliance and independent decision-making.

Robust compliance practices are not limited to real estate businesses. They can assist a company in any market segment in structuring algorithmic pricing tools, as well as the use of such tools.  Indeed, the Bureau and (and other competition enforcers around the word) are unlikely to focus solely on multifamily housing. Nor are private litigants or plaintiff-side class action firms. The United States, for example, has seen class actions filed in several industries that rely on algorithmic software, such as pharmaceuticals, health insurance, mortgage banking, and equipment rentals. Canadian businesses should take note and prepare.

What’s next?

The Bureau’s views on algorithmic pricing and competition have yet to be tested in court. While at least one class action alleging algorithmic collusion in the housing market has been filed in Canada by private parties, that too has not faced judicial scrutiny.

At least until the courts weigh in, the Bureau’s statement reflects a pragmatic but assertive approach to compliance: technology that improves efficiency can be pro-competitive and is likely welcome, but tools that erode independent rivalry or enable standardized strategies among competitors will draw scrutiny. Market participants can continue to leverage analytics—but only within a framework that preserves competition.

Meanwhile in the United States, enforcers, legislatures, and private plaintiffs are also intensifying their focus on algorithmic coordination and pricing tools—including a lawsuit by the Department of Justice, several by state Attorneys General, a series of class actions against RealPage, and a separate class action against Yardi.  Further, California became the first state to explicitly prohibit the use or distribution of “common pricing algorithms” that facilitate anticompetitive practices. New York State has enacted an even more restrictive law, essentially banning the use of algorithmic software that relies on data from at least two competing entities. 

For an overview of the recent legislative and judicial development of algorithmic pricing in the United States, see our colleagues’ analysis: Antitrust and AI: plaintiffs, enforcers and legislatures take aim at alleged AI-driven collusion. To learn more about the legal implications of algorithm pricing, check out our recent presentation on the compliance challenge of algorithm pricing from DLA Piper’s 2025 Corporate Crime, Compliance and Investigations Canadian Symposium. 

For more information on competition/antitrust updates and developments, please contact members of our Canadian and U.S. Antitrust, Competition, and Regulatory & Government Affairs Group.