Montes v. SPARC Group LLC: Washington Supreme Court holds consumer is not injured for disappointed expectations of a bargain under Washington Consumer Protection Act

On April 2, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court issued a decision in Montes v. SPARC Group LLC, holding that a consumer who purchases a product at a discounted advertised price, and receives exactly what was advertised, does not suffer a cognizable injury under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.090) – even when the seller allegedly misrepresented the product’s price history. The Court’s ruling is consistent with the majority of states applying consumer protection statutes to similar claims.

This alert summarizes the decision and discusses the practical implications for retailers and other companies employing similar pricing structures.

Background and procedural history in federal court

The defendant, Aeropostale, is a nationwide clothing retailer that sells clothing online and in brick-and-mortar stores. The plaintiff alleged Aeropostale violated the CPA by engaging in a “false discounting” scheme in which it advertised perpetual discounted prices, purportedly misleading customers into believing they were receiving a discount when the products were rarely sold at the higher price. Specifically, the allegations pertain to Aeropostale’s use of strike-through pricing to advertise discounts off the “regular price.”

The plaintiff alleged that she purchased leggings on Aeropostale’s website that had a list price of $12.50 but were advertised on sale for $6.00. She claimed she believed the leggings had a value of $12.50 and that the “sale” price of $6.00 represented a “special bargain.” However, she alleged that the leggings were offered at their stated “regular price” of $12.50 on only one day during the prior six months and otherwise sold for between $5.00 and $6.00. The plaintiff further alleged that she was injured because she would not have purchased the leggings for $6.00 if she had known that Aeropostale did not typically charge $12.50 for them. She did not allege that she failed to “receive the value that she paid for.”

Aeropostale moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff could not plead a violation of the CPA, which requires an injury to “business or property,” because she received exactly what she paid for: leggings priced at $6.00.

The district court granted the motion, holding that “while Plaintiff allege[d] her money was diminished to the extent that she paid $6 for the leggings,” she “only allege[d] that the leggings were not worth the listing price,” which she did not pay, and did “not allege that the leggings were not worth the price she paid.” The district court acknowledged that “Washington cases that find injury in false advertising are for goods and services that were different and/or worth less than what was advertised.”

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that Washington law was unclear regarding the injury standard under the CPA and certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court: “[w]hen a seller advertises a product’s price, coupled with a misrepresentation about the product’s discounted price, comparative price, or price history, does a consumer who purchases the product because of the misrepresentation suffer an ‘injury in his or her business or property’ under Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.020 and 19.86.090 if the consumer pays the advertised price?”

The Washington Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Washington Supreme Court concluded that, “without more,” a “consumer does not suffer an injury in ‘her business or property’ when she purchases – and obtains and keeps – the fungible product she sought to obtain but does so because the seller misrepresented the product’s price history.”

The Court acknowledged that a “consumer could allege economic loss if, for example, the product she received was objectively different from or less valuable than what was advertised.” In this case, however, the plaintiff “made no such allegation.” She “did not allege that the leggings she received differed in any material, objective way from the leggings advertised,” “that the leggings were worth less than the $6 she paid for them,” nor that “she tried to return them for a refund after learning about their price history.” Instead, the plaintiff “received and retained the leggings she wanted at the price she agreed to pay.” The Court held the plaintiff’s allegations “do show disappointed expectations[,] [b]ut disappointed expectations do not support a CPA claim.”

In so holding, the Washington Supreme Court joined the majority of states that have held that disappointed bargain expectations, standing alone, do not constitute the requisite injury necessary to support a private right of action under state consumer protection statute. Courts in New Jersey,[1] New York,[2] Massachusetts,[3] Missouri,[4] Illinois, Nevada, and Ohio, among others, have similarly dismissed false discounting or comparable pricing claims where plaintiffs received the products advertised at the price paid and did not allege that the goods were worth less than what they paid or were otherwise defective or different from what was promised.

Practical implications for retailers and companies using discount pricing

While the Washington Supreme Court has held that private rights of action based on deceptive sale or discounting claims are unlikely to succeed under the Washington CPA absent a cognizable injury, such claims may still succeed in other enforcement or jurisdictional contexts. In particular, claims may still proceed when brought by an attorney general, and private rights of action may remain available in certain states, including California:

• False reference pricing practices, alone, still carry attorney general enforcement risk under CPA. The Court’s decision clarifies the injury requirement applicable to CPA claims brought by private consumers. However, the court expressly noted that the alleged pricing scheme “might be addressed in a different legal claim,” including a CPA claim brought by the attorney general, which does not require proof of causation or injury to business or property. As a result, retailers and other companies may continue to exercise caution in their discount and reference-pricing practices, notwithstanding the limitations placed on private CPA claims.
  
  
• Washington aligns with the majority, but California and Ninth Circuit precedent diverge. In holding that disappointed bargain expectations alone do not constitute a cognizable injury, the Washington Supreme Court aligned itself with the majority of courts across the United States addressing similar claims. Many consumer protection statutes similarly require a showing of economic loss, suggesting that the Court’s reasoning arguably applies beyond Washington. By contrast, in California,[5] the Ninth Circuit held that “when a consumer purchases merchandise on the basis of false price information, and when the consumer alleges that he would not have made the purchase but for the misrepresentation, he has standing to sue under the [California] UCL and FAL because he has suffered an economic injury.” As a result, California will likely continue to be the plaintiffs’ bar preferred forum for such claims, but Montes and the mounting authority holding the opposite in misleading discount cases may provide a basis for California courts to revisit their reasoning.
  
  
• The dissent highlights continued debate over price‑premium theories. Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the dissent argued that a “price premium” theory could support a cognizable injury where “deceptive or misleading price history artificially increased demand for the leggings, causing an increase in the product’s market price.” The majority rejected that theory on the facts presented, holding the plaintiff’s admission that the leggings’ actual value of between $5.00 and $6.00 corresponded to the price she paid. Nonetheless, the dissent underscores that some courts – both within and outside of Washington – may continue to view price-premium theories as viable in appropriate cases.

For more information, please contact the authors.

[1] Robey v. SPARC Grp. LLC, 256 N.J. 541, 561 (2024).

[2] Belcastro v. Burberry Ltd., No. 16 CV 1080 (VEC), 2017 WL 5991782, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017).

[3] Mulder v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 15 11377 FDS, 2016 WL 393215, at *6 (D. Mass. Feb. 1, 2016), aff’d, 865 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2017).

[4] Hennessy v. Gap, 86 F.4th 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2023) (applying Missouri law).

[5] Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (July 8, 2013).