DOJ announces its first Department-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy: What companies need to know

On March 10, 2026, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) released its first Department-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) applicable to all corporate criminal matters across the Department, with the exception of antitrust violations. This announcement fulfills a commitment made by US Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche at the American Conference Institute (ACI)’s 42nd Annual Conference on FCPA and Global Anti-Corruption in December 2025, when he indicated that DOJ would promulgate a unified corporate enforcement policy applicable to criminal matters across the Department.

The new policy reflects the three core tenets outlined in DOJ’s White Collar Enforcement Plan released in May 2025 – namely, “focus, fairness, and efficiency” – and is consistent with DOJ’s stated objective to “help provide certainty and transparency regardless of the specific prosecutors involved in the investigation” and ensuring that cases are handled in an “even-handed” way.

The new CEP follows, by less than a month, the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY)’s release of its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program for Financial Crimes on February 24, 2026 (SDNY VSD Program).

Background: The Criminal Division's Corporate Enforcement Policy

DOJ’s Criminal Division has maintained a Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy since 2016, which was most recently revised in May 2025 in addition to its announcement of a new White Collar Enforcement Plan. See our previous alert on the topic here. Under the Criminal Division’s CEP, the framework applied exclusively to corporate criminal matters handled by that Division and required approval from the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. 

The CEP highlighted the Criminal Division’s commitment to transparency in describing the benefits a company can receive through voluntary disclosure and clarified the pathways for companies to achieve corporate resolutions, which included:

• CEP declinations for companies that voluntarily disclose, fully cooperate, and appropriately remediate, and where no aggravating circumstances are present
  
  
• Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) where companies fully cooperate and timely remediate but are otherwise ineligible for a declination
  
  
• The Criminal Division’s discretion to determine an appropriate resolution that does not meet the requirements of a declination or NPA

Along the same line, the White Collar Enforcement Plan highlighted the Criminal Division’s renewed core tenets of “focus, fairness, and efficiency” in enforcing white collar crime. Specifically, the Enforcement Plan summarized the areas of focus for the Criminal Division’s enforcement, including urgent criminal threats to the US. 

Key changes between the Department-wide CEP and Criminal Division CEP

While the new Department-wide CEP largely tracks the Criminal Division’s “three paths to resolution” framework, updates to the Department-wide CEP include the below.

• Department-wide scope. The new Department-wide CEP changes the landscape of corporate enforcement by applying to all corporate criminal matters handled by the Department, except for violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (antitrust matters). Notably, the new policy supersedes all component-specific or US Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies currently in effect. This means that companies facing potential criminal exposure now have a single, uniform standard governing their interactions with federal prosecutors regardless of the specific DOJ component or district involved in their matter. The policy reflects DOJ’s stated commitment to prosecuting corporate criminal conduct firmly, fairly, and efficiently while incentivizing responsible corporate behavior. US Deputy Attorney General Blanche stated, “well-intentioned businesses know that, across the Department, they will be rewarded when they self-disclose wrongdoing, cooperate with our investigations, and remediate the misconduct.”
  
  
• Early path to declination. The new CEP requires prosecutors to “endeavor to obtain relevant facts and circumstances about the disclosure in order to make a determination as to eligibility for Part I and Part II of this Policy, and, where appropriate, are encouraged to inform the company as soon as practicable.” This provision creates the opportunity for early agreed-upon paths to declination at the outset of an investigation, similar to the approach employed in SDNY’s VSD program. Although this may, in certain instances, facilitate an early agreed-upon path to declination, outcomes will likely vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular prosecutor and the circumstances of each matter, as well as on the information already available at the time of disclosure. 
  
  
• Potential for full VSD credit when reporting to civil enforcement agencies. The new CEP provides that, while disclosures made “only to federal regulatory agencies, state and local governments, or civil enforcement agencies generally do not qualify [for VSD credit],” “good faith disclosures to such entities may qualify if appropriate under the circumstances.” Although the CEP does not define which circumstances would be deemed appropriate, such circumstances could include situations in which a civil enforcement agency conducts an investigation, determines that the company fully cooperated, and subsequently uncovers new facts – not known at the time of the original disclosure – that lead the civil agency to conclude that a criminal referral is warranted. 
  
  
• Approval requirements. The prior Criminal Division CEP required all resolutions to be approved by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. The Department-wide policy broadens this requirement, mandating approval by “the Assistant Attorney General for the relevant Division and/or the United States Attorney for the relevant district,” in coordination with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the Criminal Division where specifically required by the Justice Manual.
  
  
• Recidivism language for aggravating circumstances. The Department-wide policy includes slightly modified language addressing aggravating circumstances related to recidivism, specifically referring to “corporate recidivism” and clarifying that this encompasses a criminal adjudication or resolution either within the last five years or otherwise based on similar misconduct by the entity engaged in the current misconduct.
  
  
• Cooperation credit transparency. The Department-wide CEP adds a requirement for prosecutors to include in their resolution agreements information sufficient to outline why a particular company received a particular amount of cooperation credit. 

CEP limitations 

Despite these changes, the new Department-wide CEP has its limitations in several key areas, particularly when compared to the more expansive SDNY VSD Program:

• No full benefits unless DOJ was unaware of the misconduct. Under the new CEP, a company is not eligible for full VSD benefits unless the Department was not previously aware of the misconduct. The sole exception applies where the Department learned of the misconduct through a whistleblower report and the company self-discloses within 120 days of that report to DOJ. This represents a notable departure from the SDNY VSD Program, under which a company that self-reports would remain eligible for full VSD benefits even in circumstances where the government, without the company's knowledge, was already aware of or investigating the same conduct. This includes situations in which the company knows that a whistleblower has filed a report with a government agency or that press coverage has disclosed the alleged misconduct. 
  
  
• Broad discretion on aggravating circumstances remains.  The revised CEP retains broad prosecutorial discretion in assessing aggravating circumstances. A more prescriptive approach – similar to the SDNY program, which ties aggravating circumstances to the substantive nature of the misconduct, specifically “any nexus to terrorism, sanctions evasion, foreign corruption, sex trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, international drug cartels, slavery, forced labor, or physical violence, including the knowing or reckless financing of these activities or laundering of funds in support of these activities” – may have provided greater clarity. Instead, under the revised CEP, prosecutors will evaluate aggravating circumstances based on the “nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company, severity of harm caused by the misconduct, or corporate recidivism.” This continued reliance on open-ended criteria could discourage companies from self-reporting the most serious offenses.
  
  
• Disgorgement and forfeiture still required. The new CEP still requires companies to pay all disgorgement and forfeiture in addition to restitution and victim compensation payments resulting from the misconduct at issue. This differs from the SDNY VSD Program, which does not require companies to disgorge or forfeit profits resulting from the misconduct.

The new Department-wide CEP leaves several key questions unanswered:

• Status of other VSD programs. The policy does not address the status of other VSD programs, particularly those offering more substantial incentives, such as the SDNY VSD Program and the National Security Division’s Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations (NSD VSD Policy), which offered specific benefits for export control and sanctions matters, including a presumption of declination for companies that self-disclosed, cooperated, and remediated without aggravating factors. These programs may remain operative as guidelines for certain offenses related to financial market integrity, provided they do not conflict with the broader DOJ CEP Policy.
  
  
• Treatment of ongoing VSDs. The policy is silent on the treatment of pending VSDs. However, companies currently engaged in a VSD process will likely be subject to the revised policy and may seek to obtain an early declination determination under the new framework.
  
  
• Binding effect across districts and divisions. The policy does not address whether declinations will be binding across all districts and divisions. While it has historically been unusual for another district or division to bring additional charges, a declination with department-wide effect would mitigate the risk of subsequent prosecution by DOJ components that may disagree with a single office's declination decision, thereby providing a significant additional incentive for companies considering VSD.   

Practical implications for companies

The new Department-wide CEP has several key implications for corporate compliance and enforcement strategy. 

Although the new CEP consolidates all relevant procedures and incentives associated with VSD in a single framework, it does not fundamentally alter the traditional calculus for companies considering VSD. This is particularly true given the uncertainty around the exceptions to “automatic” declinations and other potential benefits, including the determination of the severity of a given matter, which remains within the government’s discretion.

Companies that elect to voluntarily self-disclose may consider giving careful consideration to the timing of any such disclosure. While the policy emphasizes that disclosures must be “timely,” companies may also wish to gather sufficient information before making a disclosure in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining an agreed-upon path to declination at the outset of any investigation. Companies may need to carefully balance thoroughness against the risk that delay could undermine the “timeliness” of their disclosure or that the government may learn of the misconduct independently in the interim.

Given that all CEP declinations will be made public and the policy requires prosecutors to articulate the basis for particular cooperation credit determinations, the CEP provides a significant source of guidance for companies seeking to understand the Department's expectations and practices. However, this also means that companies’ conduct during investigations may become part of the public record.

DLA Piper stands ready to assist companies in navigating internal and government facing investigations, enforcement actions, and compliance matters in 2026. For more information, please contact the authors.