FCPA year in review: Enforcement trends and what’s ahead in 2026

2025 saw significant changes in the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)’s approach to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement and anti-corruption efforts.

In February, DOJ announced a “pause” in enforcement of the FCPA dictated by an Executive Order, entitled, “Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security” (FCPA EO). After some months of uncertainty, in May and June, DOJ’s Criminal Division issued the following:

• A new White Collar Enforcement Plan
• FCPA Guidelines
• A revised Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP)

This was followed by (1) the dropping of several pending FCPA and other anti-corruption matters and, (2) by contrast, the continuation (or initiation) of several enforcement actions against both individuals and corporate entities under the new guidance.

This article summarizes the year’s FCPA developments and enforcement actions and offers key takeaways for the enforcement landscape in 2026.

Current state of FCPA enforcement

DOJ has publicly indicated a commitment to enforcing the FCPA and the prosecution of international corruption and related corporate crime more generally.

Some uncertainty as to how such enforcement will proceed – and what it means for corporations’ approach to anti-corruption compliance efforts – still remains; DOJ actions since the pause was lifted have not been entirely consistent.

However, investigations and prosecutions under the revised policy have resumed. Consistent with that policy, an emerging pattern suggests that international anti-corruption enforcement remains very much a part of DOJ’s enforcement priorities – particularly in cases involving non-US companies where meaningful US interests are at stake.

Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche affirmed this message at the end of the year during the American Conference Institute (ACI)’s FCPA and Global Anti-Corruption Conference, reiterating that the following priority considerations outlined in the new FCPA Guidelines will guide enforcement:

• Individual accountability
• Conduct with a significant nexus to or an impact on US interests
• Severe misconduct
• Sufficient evidence of wrongdoing
• Efficient investigations

Deputy Attorney General Blanche stressed that the “first priority” for DOJ would be to focus on individual wrongdoers (a position consistent with prior DOJ policy) while perhaps giving equal emphasis to the notion that not all “corporate misconduct warrants federal criminal prosecution” of the corporations themselves.

Speaking at the same conference, former Acting Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of the Criminal Division Matthew Galeotti echoed that point, emphasizing that DOJ would prioritize provable misconduct of specific individuals “rather than collective knowledge theories” of corporate liability.

Former Acting AAG Galeotti further noted that DOJ will focus on “bringing enforcement actions against conduct that directly undermines US national interests without losing sight of the burdens on American companies that operate globally.” This dovetails with the FCPA EO’s direction that DOJ prioritize American interests and competitiveness.

On December 18, 2025, the Senate confirmed A. Tysen Duva to lead as Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division. Despite this change in Criminal Division leadership, AAG Duva is expected to continue the enforcement priorities and policies established under former Acting AAG Galeotti.

The few FCPA enforcement actions DOJ has pursued post-pause generally demonstrate alignment with the new FCPA Guidelines and revised CEP, particularly with regard to how DOJ continues to value self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation. These examples also reflect DOJ’s prioritization of FCPA matters involving individual misconduct, US national security and economic interests, and cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Notably, in the early days under the new policies, conduct need not intersect with each of these priorities to necessarily attract DOJ’s enforcement attention.

Unlike DOJ, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not publicly announced any new policies or strategies related to FCPA enforcement. By its actions, however, the SEC effectively paused FCPA enforcement following the FCPA EO, and it has not brought any FCPA enforcement actions since then. Similar to DOJ, the SEC dropped many of its investigations into potential FCPA violations, although some investigations continue. In 2026, SEC-led FCPA cases will likely reflect priorities similar to those communicated by DOJ, as well as those that overlap with other SEC enforcement priorities (e.g., accounting fraud) and that implicate cross-border fraud impacting US investors.

DOJ’s initial “pause” on FCPA enforcement and new FCPA Guidelines

On February 10, 2025, President Donald Trump issued the FCPA EO that paused FCPA enforcement for 180 days, pending a review of the policies and guidelines governing FCPA enforcement and the issuance of updated enforcement guidelines consistent with administration priorities.

Among other things, the stated aim of the new policies was to increasingly focus enforcement efforts on matters involving significant criminal conduct – including by cartels and TCOs – that impact US national security and economic interests.

The resulting FCPA Guidelines released by DOJ on June 9, 2025 closely reflect those policy priorities, as well as the parameters set forth in the DOJ Criminal Division’s May 2025 White Collar Enforcement Plan, by requiring prosecutors to:

• Focus on cases involving criminal misconduct by individuals
• Proceed expeditiously
• Consider collateral consequences of FCPA investigations and prosecutions, including disruption to businesses and employees

Most importantly, the FCPA Guidelines set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for prosecutors to evaluate when determining whether to pursue an FCPA investigation or enforcement action, including:

• Involvement of cartels or TCOs
• Impact to US businesses and US economic competitiveness
• Threat to US national security, particularly involving key infrastructure or assets
• Substantial bribe payments and sophisticated corruption schemes
• Likelihood of foreign law enforcement authorities taking enforcement action

However, this list is not exhaustive. The presence or absence of any of these factors will not invariably dictate whether DOJ initiates an investigation or prosecution, but they do reflect DOJ’s highest priority areas for enforcement and the overarching theme of focusing on American interests and competitiveness.

As former Acting AAG Galeotti noted in connection with the last bullet above: “Conduct that does not implicate US interests should be left to our foreign counterparts” to enforce. The FCPA Guidelines also expressly prohibit prosecutors from “focus[ing] on alleged misconduct involving routine business practices or the type of corporate conduct that involves de minimis or low-dollar, generally accepted business courtesies.”

How far this directive is to be taken remains to be seen; most FCPA matters in recent years that resulted in significant enforcement actions did not involve low-value “business courtesies.” However, some investigations (both government-facing and, more regularly, internal) have been triggered by relatively routine business entertainment – sometimes involving multiple instances that arguably are not “low-value” when aggregated. Those investigations are examining how much companies have actually spent on numerous low-value business courtesies.

The Criminal Division also updated its CEP in May 2025 to clarify the available pathways for companies to achieve corporate resolutions – including declinations, non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), and other resolutions like deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) – based upon the seriousness of the conduct involved and the extent to which the company voluntarily self-discloses, admits to wrongdoing, cooperates, and remediates.

The revised CEP generally caps DPA and NPA term lengths at three years and narrows the circumstances in which corporate monitorships may be imposed. The three alternative categories of corporate resolutions available under the revised CEP include:

• Part I – CEP Declinations: The Criminal Division will decline to prosecute a company if it voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates, and where there are no aggravating circumstances present. As part of a “Part I” CEP declination, DOJ will require companies to pay disgorgement/forfeiture as well as restitution/victim compensation payments related to the underlying misconduct.
  
  
• Part II – “Near-miss” disclosures or aggravating circumstances: The Criminal Division will enter an NPA in cases where a company fully cooperates and timely and appropriately remediates, but is otherwise ineligible under Part I of the policy because (1) the company’s self-report did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure or (2) aggravating factors warranted a criminal resolution. In such cases, DOJ will impose a resolution term of less than three years, not require an independent compliance monitor, and provide a 75-percent reduction off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines fine range.
  
  
• Part III – Other cases: Under Part III, the Criminal Division retains discretion to determine the appropriate resolution for cases that do not meet – or only partly meet – the requirements of Part I or Part II. Cases that fall under Part III are only eligible for no more than a 50-percent reduction off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines fine range, although there is a presumption that a reduction will be taken for companies that fully cooperate and timely and appropriately remediate.

During the ACI Conference, Deputy Attorney General Blanche previewed a forthcoming DOJ-wide corporate enforcement policy. Where different DOJ units currently operate a patchwork of similar-yet-separate policies, a DOJ-wide policy would have the benefit of harmonizing and level-setting the handling of corporate enforcement matters across DOJ and US Attorneys Offices. The DOJ-wide corporate enforcement policy is not likely to impact FCPA enforcement significantly as it is expected to largely track the Criminal Division’s existing CEP – focused on rewarding voluntary self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation.

DOJ officials’ statements at the ACI Conference also signaled a focus on speed of resolution, with various DOJ officials noting the aim to increase the cadence of FCPA investigations (which have often taken years). The officials simultaneously noted that DOJ has received more than 1,100 tips to its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program since it began in August 2024 – not all of which relate to the FCPA, but 80 percent of which were deemed worthy of referral to prosecution teams for investigation following DOJ’s updates to the program in May 2025. The officials’ statements suggest that DOJ’s enforcement of the FCPA will continue and that new priorities will be pursued with vigor.

2025 FCPA enforcement

Since the release of the FCPA Guidelines and revised CEP, DOJ has publicly pursued a handful of FCPA-related enforcement actions against individuals and corporate entities, as well as declined to prosecute or dismissed several cases. Publicly available actions are a relatively small sample size; nonetheless, some key insights can be gleaned.

FCPA-related prosecutions and enforcement actions

Notwithstanding DOJ purposefully halting FCPA enforcement for several months in 2025, it still managed to pursue several cases once the DOJ policies were revised and its enforcement priorities were established. These matters include the below.

• DOJ has pursued several separate cases in federal court focused on alleged FCPA and related violations by individuals, including the following:

• In March, following the FCPA EO, a federal judge granted a motion by a former coal executive to continue proceedings related to criminal FCPA, money laundering, and wire fraud charges. The executive had previously been charged in 2022 in connection with an alleged scheme to bribe Egyptian government officials to secure contracts with an Egyptian state-owned company. Despite the continuance, the case is still being prioritized by prosecutors and is expected to go to trial in February 2026.
  
  

• An indictment unsealed in August charged two Mexican citizens/US lawful permanent residents with conspiring to pay bribes to officials of a state-owned Mexican oil company to secure energy contracts. In December, one of the individuals was convicted; the other remains at large. Although the indictment does not allege connections between the defendants and cartels or TCOs, related motions by DOJ suggest that one of the defendants had ties to Mexican cartel members and was previously involved in violent conduct in Mexico (unrelated to the bribery allegations). The defendant vigorously denied the claim – initially made only in a press release with no supporting evidence adduced – and the district court subsequently excluded any reference to or evidence regarding any putative cartel ties.
  
  

• In August, an individual was convicted by a federal jury in the Central District of California of charges related to his receipt of a $2.1 million bribe while serving as an officer of a Nigerian state-owned oil company. The charges included money laundering, obstruction, and tax evasion. The payment related to the individual’s role in securing favorable drilling rights for a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned oil company.
  
  

• In September, a federal jury convicted a US businessman on FCPA-related charges in connection with a nearly five-year-long scheme to bribe Honduran government officials to secure contracts related to the procurement of Honduran law enforcement uniforms.
  
  

• In December, the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected a defense motion to dismiss criminal corruption and money laundering charges against a US–Ghanaian national related to the development of a power plant in Ghana by a Turkish energy company. Prosecutors allege that the individual, who was extradited to the US in 2024 and who previously served as managing director of a Ghana state-owned oil refinery, paid bribes to obtain key government approvals for the project and laundered the proceeds through US financial institutions. The case is ongoing.

• In October, DOJ announced a superseding indictment charging a multinational voting machine company and four (previously indicted) individuals with violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA, as well as charges related to money laundering. The indictment alleges the parties participated in a scheme to pay bribes to a Philippine government official in connection with contracts related to the 2016 Philippine national elections. The matter remains ongoing.
  
  

• DOJ entered into the first FCPA DPA under the revised CEP in November after re-opening a previously closed investigation regarding bribe payments by a Guatemalan telecommunications company to Guatemalan officials. This scheme intersected with cartels and TCOs insofar as some of the underlying cash bribe payments originated from laundered narcotrafficking proceeds. In reaching this resolution, DOJ applied its revised CEP, which led to a “Part III” determination resulting in the DPA. In the DPA, DOJ partially credited the company’s initial voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation efforts, and comprehensive global compliance program. Although the DPA required the company to pay a $60 million criminal penalty (plus $58.2 million in forfeiture), that penalty reflected the maximum 50-percent discount off the bottom end of the applicable penalty range under the US Sentencing Guidelines. Rather than impose a corporate monitor, the two-year DPA requires the company to annually report to DOJ on remediation and implementation of compliance measures.

Declinations and dismissals

In this sample size of publicly available actions, the number of dismissals only partly sheds light on DOJ’s enforcement trends. A more significant statistic may be the number of active FCPA investigations or proposed enforcement actions DOJ declined to prosecute – as opposed to resolving them through CEP declinations – or closed during the pause without plans to continue them. Some media reports indicate that DOJ closed up to half of all then-pending investigations, but that percentage cannot be confirmed given that many investigations are not publicly disclosed.

The FCPA EO instructed Attorney General Pam Bondi to “review in detail all existing FCPA investigations or enforcement actions and take appropriate action with respect to such matters to restore proper bounds on FCPA enforcement and preserve Presidential foreign policy prerogatives.” Only anecdotal information exists about these cases, mostly derived from corporate disclosures (typically in the context of the subset of investigations that had previously been publicly disclosed) or the experiences of counsel. While incomplete, this information suggests that DOJ declined to prosecute or closed a number of FCPA investigations during the pause.

DOJ notably dismissed some high-profile cases that it had previously (and vigorously) pursued in the courts.

• In April, following the FCPA enforcement pause, DOJ dismissed longstanding FCPA charges against former executives of Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. who had been pending trial for several years on charges involving the alleged authorization of millions of dollars in bribes to officials in India. The SEC also dismissed a related, pending civil enforcement action against the executives, citing dismissal was “appropriate as a policy matter” and not an assessment of the case “on the merits.”
  
  
• In April, a Norwegian oil and gas company announced that DOJ closed its inquiry into the company regarding potential corruption in connection with undisclosed projects in Africa. The company cited the FCPA EO as one reason for the closure of DOJ’s investigation, although a separate – yet related – investigation by Norwegian authorities remains ongoing.
  
  
• In April, a Caribbean telecommunications company announced that DOJ had closed its investigation into possible FCPA violations, which had previously begun after the company voluntarily self-reported findings from an internal investigation. DOJ’s closure of its investigation followed the FCPA EO, extensive cooperation by the company, and the company’s enhancements to its compliance program.
  
  
• DOJ issued its first CEP FCPA declination under the new policies in August, in a case involving allegations of corrupt conduct by an Indian subsidiary of a US company. The subsidiary allegedly paid bribes to Indian government officials to secure business. DOJ’s determination to decline to prosecute the company took into account the company’s voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, remediation, significant compliance improvements, agreement to disgorgement, and the absence of aggravating factors.
  
  
• In September, a US produce distributor announced in securities filings that DOJ closed an FCPA investigation into the company’s operations in Mexico. The company had previously disclosed in its annual report that its Board of Directors had established a Special Committee to investigate potential FCPA issues related to the company’s business in Mexico and had voluntarily disclosed its internal investigation to DOJ (and the SEC). The SEC subsequently issued a no-action letter to the company in December.
  
  
• In December, DOJ moved to dismiss all charges against a former broadcasting executive and his company, formerly convicted after trial for their roles in a high-profile international bribery scheme connected with FIFA and involving broadcast rights for international soccer championship matches. This decision was particularly notable given the history of the case. In July, the US Court of Appeals for Second Circuit reversed a decision by the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York to throw out the convictions under the “honest services wire fraud” statute (Section 1346 of Title 18), in connection with a scheme to pay millions of dollars in bribes as part of the FIFA corruption scandal. The Second Circuit unanimously held that foreign commercial bribery schemes (not involving payments to government officials) fall within the honest services wire fraud statute and reinstated the convictions. United States v. Lopez, 143 F.4th 99, 116 (2d Cir. 2025). What was viewed as a significant appellate victory for the government – coming after a trial jury convicted the defendants following a trial that included evidence of substantial conduct within the US by a US citizen – resulted in the government dropping all charges.

Takeaways from 2025 and considerations for 2026

Following DOJ’s issuance of the FCPA Guidelines and updated CEP earlier this year, enforcement trends signal several through-lines for DOJ’s anticipated posture in 2026.

As noted above, DOJ will likely prioritize cases involving more severe misconduct in matters with meaningful ties to US economic and national interests, such as matters involving (1) cartels and TCOs and (2) national security or critical infrastructure. DOJ has also been explicit that it will seek to minimize the impact on US companies doing business internationally and seek to avoid disadvantaging US business competitiveness.

While FCPA enforcement actions have been relatively few and far between in 2025, recent examples indicate that DOJ remains committed to investigating and resolving FCPA matters, along with other forms of white-collar corporate criminal misconduct. Notably, these observations are based on a fairly small sample size of government actions to date, not all of which have been remarkably consistent. That said, key takeaways from the 2025 FCPA enforcement landscape and expectations for 2026 include the below.

• Serious bribery schemes involving significant bribe payments will be prioritized. DOJ has stated that it will prioritize cases that involve substantial bribe payments, sophisticated efforts to conceal corrupt schemes, fraudulent conduct, and other indicia of corrupt intent by the individuals involved. Pervasive bribery schemes, rather than cases involving possibly “routine business practices” or arguably de minimis payments, will be fast-tracked for investigation and enforcement consideration.
  
  
• Cooperation, remediation, and voluntary disclosure remain key in mitigating enforcement risks. The core principles of the revised CEP continue to reward companies that voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate. The CEP provides a more definitive roadmap for companies to anticipate the likely resolution outcome in the event of an enforcement action. Resolution terms and obligations remain dependent upon the specific circumstances of the case and sometimes depend on subjective interpretations, such as what amounts to an “aggravating factor” that might make a company ineligible for a CEP declination. Still, under Part III of the CEP, companies can receive reductions of up to 50 percent off penalty calculations where they cooperate and remediate, despite not fully satisfying the requirements of CEP Parts I and II. Timely voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely and appropriate remediation remain the clearest pathway for companies to mitigate significant penalties.
  
  
• DOJ consistently rewards companies with strong compliance programs. The effectiveness of a company’s compliance program remains a key factor in DOJ’s decision to prosecute a company and, if so, the types of potential applicable resolutions and the scope of potential penalties and compliance obligations – including DOJ’s decision on whether to impose a corporate compliance monitor as part of a resolution. To mitigate enforcement risks, companies are encouraged to be proactive before an investigation arises by (1) taking risk-based steps to evaluate and enhance internal controls and (2) updating anti-corruption policies, including those related to managing third-party relationships, interactions with government officials, and employee conduct (e.g., ephemeral messaging). Other compliance-minded and preventative steps companies can take include investing in compliance resources; promoting internal reporting channels; conducting and measuring compliance testing that includes root cause analyses and remediation; and accounting for the risks associated with emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence. Additionally, companies can integrate compliance throughout the organization in a manner that supports a culture of compliance that reduces the risk of misconduct and, in the event that there is misconduct, mitigates enforcement risks. Companies are encouraged to evaluate whether their current controls and compliance environment match DOJ compliance expectations, including by proactively conducting compliance assessments to ensure that existing programs are up to DOJ standards.
  
  
• Monitorships are increasingly unlikely. Despite the continued attention on effective compliance programs, DOJ has acknowledged the significant cost and burden monitorships impose on companies. As outlined in the Criminal Division’s memorandum issued on May 12, 2025, DOJ is more likely to impose self-reporting obligations – rather than independent compliance monitors – where post-resolution compliance monitoring is appropriate. (Independent monitors are now even less likely outside of the most exceptional cases.) Indeed, DOJ ended several monitorships early – or paused the appointment of pending monitorships – following the announcement of the FCPA EO and enforcement pause. This policy shift reduces some of the burden inherent to an independent monitor and increases the flexibility for companies to approach compliance program enhancements; however, companies are not encouraged to treat this as an opportunity to shelve appropriate compliance program remediation and enhancements. Future misconduct that may have been facilitated by a failure to adequately remediate and enhance the compliance program will likely lead to increased scrutiny.
  
  
• Companies operating in jurisdictions where cartels and TCOs operate face heightened scrutiny. A significant policy point underlying the FCPA Guidelines relates to leveraging enforcement actions to protect US national security interests, including the “total elimination of cartels and TCOs.” Although touchpoints to cartels or TCOs are not a prerequisite for FCPA enforcement and will not feature in all FCPA-related actions, indirect touchpoints to cartels or TCOs may be enough for DOJ to prioritize a matter for investigation and enforcement. Thus, companies operating in jurisdictions where cartels or TCOs have a presence face heightened enforcement risks, particularly where cartels or TCOs are frequently intertwined in local and national economies and financial institutions. The same is so for corrupt conduct that touches on vital US infrastructure or national security more broadly.
  
  
• Closed DOJ investigations often remain dormant but can re-emerge. DOJ, often under its own discretion, commonly closes investigations for a variety of reasons – including lack of substantial evidence, unclear US jurisdiction, or incompatibility with US prosecutorial or policy interests. However, closed investigations can be re-opened. Although uncommon, the re-opening of investigations most frequently occurs when DOJ learns of new misconduct or new information related to historical misconduct that was not previously reported or identified. Companies can guard against the risk of DOJ re-opening a closed investigation by undertaking comprehensive remediation of compliance issues to avoid an unresolved problem from worsening and consequently prompting new allegations of misconduct. Companies are likewise encouraged to thoroughly and promptly respond to internal hotline reports to mitigate issues and limit the risk of a report to DOJ (or another agency) out of concern that the issue is not being properly handled. Finally, companies should be mindful that DOJ (including in future administrations with different priorities) can re-open an investigation for any reason, and finality does not set in until the applicable statute of limitations expires. To the extent DOJ declines to open an investigation or closes one that had already been underway, one salient point is the applicable statute of limitations – which for FCPA is generally five or six years (but can be extended or “tolled” by DOJ under certain circumstances).

Contact

DLA Piper stands ready to assist companies in navigating FCPA-related investigations, enforcement actions, and compliance matters in 2026. For more information, please contact the authors.