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20 November 2026 • 10 minute read

BIS addresses the remote access gap as congressional scrutiny of US semiconductor export controls intensifies

Recent scrutiny surrounding compliance with US restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports has added urgency to an existing debate in Washington, DC: how effective and enforceable are US semiconductor export controls? Policymakers are increasingly confronting a broader question than the circumstances of any one company: whether the current framework is equipped to prevent advanced US computing technology from reaching restricted end users through third countries, intermediaries, or remote access.

That debate is already translating into policy. On November 16, 2026, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule (IFR), titled “Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors,” which takes effect on November 19, 2026. Interested parties have 60 days after publication to submit comments to BIS. At the same time, lawmakers on Capitol Hill appear poised to accelerate legislative efforts and signaled interest in addressing perceived enforcement gaps and in oversight of both industry compliance and the federal government’s administration of export controls.

This alert summarizes the IFR, examines the congressional dynamics that may shape next steps, and offers key considerations for affected companies

A shift from controlling chips to controlling compute

Through the IFR, BIS, at the direction of the US Department of the Treasury and the National Security Council, addresses what it has identified as a gap in US export controls by restricting Chinese companies’ remote access to US advanced computing items through offshore cloud providers.

BIS clarifies in the IFR that, with limited exceptions, it now treats providing remote access to these items as a restricted end use when the recipient is headquartered in Macau or a Country Group D:5 destination, including China. That end use triggers an export license requirement, even if the underlying software and commodities are never physically re-transferred to these firms, and even if the firms were already receiving the services when the IFR took effect.

The rule focuses not only on where controlled chips are shipped, but also on who can use the computing power those chips provide. Under the IFR, BIS treats providing a restricted party with remote access to advanced computing power from data centers outside China or other restricted destinations as similar to physically shipping a controlled processor.

That shift applies the existing framework that has historically centered on performance thresholds, destinations, end-users, and licensing requirements for covered hardware, to certain remote-access arrangements and may extend compliance obligations for chip manufacturers, cloud providers, data center operators, and their customers beyond traditional shipping and logistics.

Key provisions of the IFR 

Destination-based license requirements

  • Elimination of the worldwide license requirement. The IFR formally removes the worldwide licensing requirement implemented by the artificial intelligence (AI) Diffusion Rule on advanced computing items under the Regional Stability controls in 15 C.F.R. § 742.6. BIS retains a license requirement in § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(2) for advanced computing items sent to destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5, excluding destinations specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6, as well as certain entities in the United Arab Emirates (as explained in 91 FR 43034).

  • New license requirement for diversion-risk countries. The IFR adds a new license requirement in § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1) for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers of advanced computing items to or within jurisdictions BIS describes as high-risk for diversion, which include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil. Transactions in which the ultimate consignee or end-user (or its ultimate parent) is headquartered in the US are exempt, subject to a new monthly reporting requirement to BIS.

End-use license requirements

A new end-use control in 15 C.F.R. § 744.24 restricts providing advanced computing items to any data center worldwide when the provider knows the items will be used in a data center that provides cloud-based computing capabilities exceeding more than 12 million “aggregate total processing performance.” The restriction applies when that access is provided, at a single data center or through data centers that are physically or digitally linked, “to or for” companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, Macau or a Country Group D:5 destination, including China.

  • Exporters must look to the direct and indirect end users of the advanced computing items, rather than only to the data center operator, in determining whether a transaction is on behalf of such an entity.

  • Affected data center operators have 90 days from publication of the IFR on November 19, 2026 to obtain a BIS license to continue providing cloud compute services to these customers.

  • A narrow carve-out applies to computing power provided exclusively for a “commercial recommender system,” such as those used by online retailers or social media companies, but not for agents that use large language models or perform generative AI functions.

  • The incorporation of advanced computing items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) into a non-US origin item does not eliminate the licensing requirement if there is knowledge at any point in the supply chain of a prohibited end use, notwithstanding the EAR de minimis threshold.

Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule

The AI Diffusion Rule, which BIS announced in May 2025 that it would rescind and had not enforced, is formally withdrawn, including its model-weight controls, certain license exceptions, and its data center authorization programs. Specifically, the IFR:

  • Removes controls on model weights (ECCN 4E091), including the model weights foreign direct product rule in § 734.9(l), Red Flag 28, and the “model weights” definition;

  • Eliminates License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (§ 740.27), License Exception Low Processing Performance (§ 740.29), and the Data Center Validated End User authorization;

  • Retains the worldwide scope of the advanced computing foreign direct product rule in § 734.9(h), with BIS emphasizing that it retains jurisdiction over a 3A090 IC after incorporation into a foreign-made board or server; and

  • Retains License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (§ 740.28).

Considerations for front-end fabricators and outsourced semiconductor assembly and test companies

The IFR continues to rely on the Approved Integrated Circuit (IC) Designer list (Supplement No. 6 to Part 740) and the Authorized IC Designer definition (Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a) in determining whether the Note 1 presumption applies. Chips produced by companies that are not Authorized or Approved IC Designers now face a presumption that they are controlled under ECCN 3A090.a if they meet the definition of an “applicable advanced logic integrated circuit” (e.g., produced at a 16/14 nanometer node).

Congressional scrutiny of export controls

Legislative momentum and proposals

Recent bipartisan proposals address remote access, chip security, and the government’s visibility into where advanced processors ultimately end up, including the Remote Access Security Act, AI Overwatch Act, Chip Security Act, and Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act. Lawmakers have also proposed including semiconductor-related provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act to address Chinese access to US computing capabilities. Together, these proposals indicate a growing interest in pairing traditional licensing restrictions with tools addressing remote access, diversion, and post-sale visibility into advanced computing hardware.

Commercial competitiveness and national security

Congress may also weigh commercial competitiveness against national security. Semiconductor companies have stated that policies they view as overly restrictive could erode US market share, push foreign customers toward alternatives, and ultimately weaken the global standing of the US technology sector. Recent congressional scrutiny of potential diversion or circumvention, however, could lend support to policymakers’ position that the government’s ability to verify both end users and end uses should carry greater weight in licensing decisions.

Congressional oversight of BIS

Congressional oversight may also extend beyond individual technology companies to the federal government’s own administration of export controls. Some members of Congress have raised questions about the timing of certain US Department of Commerce decisions, the operation of the Entity List process, and how national security concerns raised elsewhere in government were reflected in BIS licensing and enforcement decisions. These questions may be pursued through hearings, document requests, or other inquiries involving industry executives as well as senior officials responsible for export-control policy and enforcement.

Congress may examine whether BIS has the resources, authorities, and institutional safeguards necessary to administer increasingly complex controls, and whether additional independent or congressional oversight is warranted where licensing, Entity List designations, and enforcement decisions involve economic and national security considerations. Closer scrutiny of BIS could also weaken industry’s influence over export-control policy, as lawmakers and regulators become less receptive to competitiveness arguments and more inclined to emphasize verification, end-use monitoring, and enforcement..

The post-midterm landscape

The results of the recent midterm elections could amplify these dynamics. The immediate policy consequence has the potential to renew the momentum for tightening the architecture of export controls (strengthening end-use verification, remote-access restrictions and post-sale monitoring) rather than simply adding more chips to the control list. Because concerns about diversion have drawn interest from members of both parties, oversight of economic statecraft tools, such as export controls, are sure to continue in the next Congress. That oversight could focus on end-use verification, remote-access restrictions, and post-sale monitoring, and may include hearings, reporting requirements, or requests for information. Committees seeking information about governmental decision-making may also request information from industry participants. Manufacturers, cloud providers, and other affected companies may wish to consider how they would respond to such inquiries.

Implications for industry

For industry, the IFR and related congressional activity could place greater emphasis on demonstrating that compliance programs addresscan sufficiently protect both US national security and economic interests. The IFR and related legislative proposals, and may reflect a broader shift [MK9.1]from controlling the movement of advanced chips toward controlling access to advanced computing power throughout its lifecycle. Companies may wish to assess whether their compliance programs account for end-user identity, corporate ownership and affiliations, the location of computing infrastructure, remote-access arrangements, and changes in how customers use computing capacity after an initial transaction.

Next steps

Affected companies may wish to evaluate upcoming and existing data center transactions and projects, including the foreign parties involved and the allocation of compute power within their organizations and to customers. Companies that manufacture, distribute, or deploy advanced computing items, including hyperscalers, neocloud providers, and data center operators, may wish to consider:

  • Identifying any shipments, pending orders, or deployments of advanced compute equipment involving Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (in addition to jurisdictions that already required a license);

  • Confirming whether transactions qualify for the US-headquartered company exclusion and, if so, establishing a process for monthly reporting by the exporter or its agent;

  • Reviewing export compliance customer diligence questionnaires, processes, and contracts to determine whether they address end use and access after sale or delivery;

  • Determining whether the new restrictions apply to existing remote-access arrangements and, if so, whether a license application is needed within the 90-day window;

  • Assessing preparedness for potential congressional requests for information, including requests relating to licensing and Entity List decisions; and

  • Considering whether to submit comments on the IFR within the 60-day period, either independently or through an industry group.

Conclusion

Taken together, the IFR and recent congressional scrutiny reflect a focus on access to advanced computing capacity, not only where the hardware is shipped. Under this approach, advanced AI chips are treated more like controlled strategic assets than conventional commercial products.

For questions about how these developments may affect your operations or compliance programs, please contact the authors.