Antitrust Bites – Newsletter

ICA adopts first guidelines on online reviews

On 13 October 2026, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) adopted guidelines to help traders implement measures to ensure they comply with the requirements for online reviews.

The guidelines implement Article 21 of Law No. 34/2026 (annual law on small and medium-sized enterprises) – which aims to combat unlawful reviews in the restaurant and tourism sectors.

They build on the provisions of the Consumer Code. These provisions classify as misleading any claim that reviews come from consumers who have actually used or purchased the product without taking reasonable and proportionate measures to verify this. The provisions also cover submitting, directly or through third parties, false reviews or false endorsements. Although adopted with reference to the sectors covered by Law No. 34/2026, namely the restaurant and tourism sectors, the guidelines also provide guidance on the interpretation of the Consumer Code’s provisions on reviews which apply, in principle, to any sector.

The guidelines apply to all traders, wherever established, who direct their activities towards Italy and provide review publication services. This includes both traders that sell the goods or services being reviewed and those that manage reviews of third-party goods or services.

The guidelines set out specific principles for traders that offer tools for reviewing their own goods and services, as well as for platforms hosting third-party reviews where their role is not merely technical, automatic and passive, but active (for example, where there is a shared economic interest or assistance in optimising the presentation of reviews).

Traders should clearly explain, in the same interface where reviews are displayed (including via a clearly identified link), how reviews are collected, moderated and verified, what criteria are used to classify them as “verified,” and how average scores are calculated, specifying whether they are influenced by incentivised reviews or other contractual relationships.

In compliance with the GDPR and the Italian Privacy Code, traders should adopt reasonable measures, proportionate to the nature of their activity and the size of their business, of three types:

• tools designed to verify that the consumer has actually used or purchased the reviewed product or service (for example, requesting tax documentation, an order or booking number, a link sent to all customers after use, a QR code or an OTP)
• tools designed to make the author of the reviews traceable
• automated tools to detect anomalies and fraudulent activity (eg many reviews posted in a short period from the same IP address, or repetitive linguistic patterns); where an anomaly is detected, the review should not be automatically deleted but should undergo a prompt further check, including through dialogue with the author

The guidelines also require traders to keep track of the origin of each review, the checks performed and decisions on publication, rejection or removal, and to adopt objective and symmetrical criteria (for both positive and negative reviews) for managing outdated reviews.

Particular attention is given to incentivised reviews: those whose content results from an incentive are always unlawful; in other cases, the incentive must not be capable of compromising the authenticity of the review, and the review must be marked with clearly visible graphic elements.

Manipulative practices are also prohibited, such as removing or concealing negative reviews, using pre-filled templates for positive reviews, involving consumers in moderation to induce them to modify their reviews, and presenting aggregated ratings based on non-transparent criteria.

Traders that host reviews of goods and services offered by third parties and present them, even implicitly, as “verified” should take reasonable and proportionate measures to ensure that those reviews come from consumers who have actually purchased or used the product. They should also handle complaints in a timely and transparent manner and remove manifestly unlawful reviews without delay. Removal requests must be precise and substantiated and, where reports are not manifestly unfounded, both the author and the complainant must be given the opportunity to present their views.

The guidelines specify that, although Article 19 of Law No. 34/2026 provides that a review is lawful if posted within 30 days of use of the service, publishing a review submitted after that deadline does not in itself infringe the Consumer Code.

Finally, the guidelines clarify that their principles will guide the ICA in assessing commercial practices relating to the publication and moderation of reviews, and that the measures indicated are illustrative and not exhaustive.

The ICA will review the guidelines within one year of publication.

 

Video games and virtual currencies: CPC Network launches coordinated actions to protect consumers

In a press release dated 30 September 2026, the European Commission announced new coordinated enforcement actions in the video game sector under Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, launched by the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC Network), which brings together the national authorities responsible for consumer protection in the countries of the European Economic Area. The aim is to ensure transparency and fairness in the use of virtual currencies for in-game purchases, with particular attention to the protection of minors.

The action addresses mechanisms that may obscure the actual cost of purchases: content is often offered in exchange for virtual currencies, purchased with real money and sometimes subject to multiple conversions. In addition, selling currency exclusively in predefined bundles may force players to purchase more than they need to obtain the desired content, distorting their economic decisions.

The actions follow the Key Principles on In-game Virtual Currencies, published by the CPC Network in March 2025 to strengthen consumer protection in the video game sector and provide businesses with guidance on the application of EU consumer protection law to the offering of virtual currencies. The principles require:

• clear indication of prices in real money
• no conversions or multiple currencies that conceal actual costs
• no mechanisms that force consumers to make unwanted currency purchases
• comprehensible pre-contractual information
• respect for the right of withdrawal within 14 days, including for purchased but unused currency
• fair and clear contractual terms
• adequate safeguards for vulnerable consumers, including minors.

The CPC Network's Joint Statement also noted that the Key Principles and dialogue with the industry had not been sufficient to bring about substantive changes in the practices of many businesses, adding that the self-regulatory initiatives introduced (PEGI) often fail to address the core of harmful practices. It also drew attention to loot boxes, paid mechanisms that award random rewards, manipulative techniques (dark patterns) such as misleading countdown timers and false scarcity claims, and aggressive practices targeting vulnerable consumers and direct exhortations to minors to make purchases, which are expressly prohibited under EU law.

One of the coordinated actions was launched by the ICA, acting as lead authority under Article 17(2) of the Regulation, together with the Norwegian and Danish authorities. The action seeks to establish whether there is a widespread infringement within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the Regulation, involving conduct contrary to EU consumer protection law that is liable to harm the interests of consumers residing in at least three member states.

As part of the action, under the Regulation, the authorities coordinate their investigative activities and may adopt a common position on the findings and assessment of the practices under examination (Article 19 of the Regulation), on the basis of which they may invite the companies to propose commitments to address the concerns identified (Article 20). Each authority retains the power, within its own jurisdiction, to adopt the measures necessary to bring the infringements to an end and impose any penalties (Article 21).

 

Court of Justice rules on the deadline for filing referral requests under Article 22 of Regulation No. 139/2004

By its judgment of 8 October 2026, the Court of Justice confirmed the judgment of the General Court (see our July 2025 newsletter), which had held that the European Commission’s decision to examine a merger at the request of the Luxembourg Competition Authority (ACL), pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation No. 139/2004, was lawful.

This provision allows Member States to request that the Commission examine a merger which, although lacking a Community dimension, affects trade between Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the request.

The dispute concerns the determination of the dies a quo of the deadline for submitting the referral request under Article 22 of the Regulation, which states that “request shall be made at most within 15 working days of the date on which the concentration was notified, or if no notification is required, otherwise made known to the Member State concerned.”

In the present case, although the transaction did not have a Community dimension nor was it subject to a national regime of prior merger control (which does not exist in Luxembourg), on December 22, 2023, the parties to the transaction had informed the ACL, which subsequently filed a referral request with the Commission on February 7. The Commission accepted the referral, finding that the 15-working-day deadline had been met, as it began to run on January 17, 2024 – the date on which the ACL first received, from third parties, relevant information regarding the merger and its effects.

The claimants contested the timeliness of the referral request, arguing that the merger had been brought to the ACL’s attention no later than January 10, 2024, when a meeting took place between the parties to the transaction and the ACL.

The Court clarified that, for a concentration to be considered “made known” for the purposes of the commencement of the time limit, relevant and sufficient information must be provided to the competent authority to enable it to conduct a preliminary assessment of whether the conditions set forth in Article 22 of the Regulation are met, as well as of the advisability of submitting a request for a referral. For these purposes, it is irrelevant whether the information was provided by the undertakings concerned, by third parties, or by any other source.

The Court therefore confirmed that mere knowledge of the existence of a merger is not sufficient to trigger the 15-working-day period, as it does not allow the competent authority to conduct the necessary preliminary assessment. A different interpretation would impose a considerable administrative burden on that authority and would render the referral mechanism provided for in Article 22 of the Regulation ineffective. In fact, if mere knowledge of the existence of a merger were sufficient to trigger the 15-working-day period, the national competition authority concerned would be required to mobilize, within a particularly short timeframe, considerable resources to obtain the information necessary to conduct the preliminary assessment of the conditions required to proceed with the referral.

 

Delays in administrative action and the re-exercise of the power to impose sanctions

On 19 October 2026, the Council of State, in two identical rulings, upheld an appeal seeking enforcement of two final judgements which annulled two infringement decisions by the ICA on the grounds of the late commencement of proceedings and the resulting loss of the Authority's sanctioning powers. The Council of State consequently annulled two decisions by which the ICA had imposed sanctions for the same unfair commercial practices that had been the object of the annulled decisions.

The authority had re-exercised its power to impose sanctions in light of rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the limitation period for the initiation of investigations pursuant to Article 14 of Law No. 689/1981. Referring to the judgment delivered in case C-510/23, the ICA argued that the expiration of the time limits for initiating proceedings would no longer automatically preclude the exercise of its power to impose sanctions.

The Council of State disagreed with the authority’s argument. Firstly, it recalls the principle established by European case law according to which EU law does not require the review of a judgment which has acquired the force of res judicata. Secondly, it observes that the CJEU judgment relied on by the ICA concerns specifically the interpretation of Article 14 of Law No. 689/1981. By contrast, the res judicata established by the Council of State’s earlier judgements did not relate only to said provision, but also to the time limit for opening the investigation under Article 6 of the ICA’s 2015 Regulation, as well as to the excessive duration of the preliminary investigation phase, which was found to be incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Finally, the court considered that there is no immediate conflict between its previous rulings and the recent judgements of the CJEU, noting that, regardless of the issue relating to Article 14, the Court of Justice itself recognises that national rules establishing procedural time limits must ensure that cases are dealt with within a reasonable time. Consequently, the lapse of time may result in the loss of the administrative authority's powers where the excessive duration of proceedings adversely affects the rights of defence.

 

French Competition Authority finesbelow-threshold merger for the first time by applying antitrust rules

With a press release dated 22 October 2026, the French Competition Authority announced that it had, for the first time, imposed fines on the companies involved in a below-threshold merger by applying national provisions prohibiting anticompetitive agreements.

The decision concerned a company’s acquisition of sole control over a competitor in the sector for the management of potentially infectious medical waste in La Réunion. Following the transaction, the post-merger entity became the sole operator in the medical waste treatment market and the leading operator in the medical waste collection and transport market, with a market share of approximately 80%.

Since the revenue thresholds that would have triggered a notification requirement at the European and national levels were not met, the transaction was not subject to merger control review. The authority, however, examined it in light of the rules governing anticompetitive agreements, applying the principles established by the Court of Justice in the Towercast judgment (C-449/21), which recognised the possibility of subjecting below-threshold mergers to ex-post scrutiny based on the provisions prohibiting anticompetitive practices.

The authority found that the agreement to acquire the target company constituted direct and sufficient evidence of a meeting of minds between the parties, a necessary prerequisite for establishing a restrictive agreement. The authority then assessed whether the transaction had resulted in a significant impediment to effective competition, conducting a counterfactual analysis in light of the analytical framework used in merger control. As a result of this analysis, the authority identified anticompetitive effects:

• In the medical waste treatment market, where the transaction eliminated competition, creating a monopoly likely to become entrenched due to significant regulatory barriers to entry and the absence, on the island, of alternative treatment methods or the possibility of exporting waste.
• In the medical waste collection and transport market, which, following the transaction, is characterized by a high degree of concentration. The fact that the post-merger entity operates in both waste treatment and waste collection and transport appears likely to produce vertical anticompetitive effects, since competing operators active in collection and transport are forced to entrust the subsequent treatment of the waste to the same post-merger entity – which holds a monopoly in that market – in the absence of alternative solutions.

Given the unprecedented nature of applying the provisions on anticompetitive agreements to a below-threshold merger, the authority imposed a symbolic fine of EUR1 on each of the parties. The decision is nonetheless significant from a systemic perspective, confirming that failing to exceed the notification thresholds does not necessarily shield a transaction from subsequent antitrust scrutiny if it is likely to produce significant anticompetitive effects.