US–French coordination in anti-corruption enforcement: Takeaways from the Balt global resolution

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and France’s Parquet National Financier (PNF) recently announced coordinated settlements with Balt SAS, a French medical device manufacturer, and its American affiliate, Balt USA LLC (collectively, Balt). These actions stemmed from a scheme to bribe doctors in France and Belgium, violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and France’s Sapin II anti-corruption statute.

Notably, DOJ declined to prosecute Balt on March 19, 2026 under its newly implemented Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), which was introduced just nine days earlier and superseded the pre-existing Criminal Division CEP. See our previous client alert summarizing the Department-wide CEP here.

On March 19, 2026, the PNF also entered into a Convention Judiciaire d’Intérêt Public (CJIP) with Balt. Separately, a US federal court in the Central District of California indicted David Ferrera, a former Balt USA executive, and Marc Tilman, a consultant from Belgium, for their alleged involvement in the scheme.

This case is the first to be resolved under the new CEP. The resolution marks the first time the French prosecuting authority, the PNF, has explicitly acknowledged “autorévélation” (voluntary self-disclosure) as a mitigating factor in a CJIP, signaling a notable shift in French enforcement practice. It also highlights the growing alignment between US and French anti-corruption enforcement approaches – including a crediting mechanism to avoid duplicative punishment and mutual deference on compliance oversight – while suggesting the importance of timing and sequencing considerations regarding voluntary self-disclosures across jurisdictions. See our previous alert discussing implications for US–French cross-border investigations here.

The resolution reinforces that corporate settlements do not protect individuals from prosecution in the US or France, and it underscores that the life sciences sector continues to be an enforcement priority for authorities on both sides of the Atlantic.

While the resolution aligns with DOJ’s stated white collar enforcement priorities, the underlying conduct does not squarely fit within the May 2025 white collar crime memorandum, which states a focus on prioritizing various “high-impact areas” that are “key threats to America.” Nor does it squarely align with the June 2025 FCPA guidelines' narrower focus on total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), safeguarding fair opportunities for US companies, advancing US national security, and prioritizing investigations of serious misconduct.

This raises questions about how similar matters would be treated going forward. In this alert, we provide key takeaways from the coordinated resolutions for companies navigating cross-border anti-corruption risk.

The alleged scheme

Between 2013 and 2023, Balt made payments to two doctors – one at a French public hospital (Centre Hospitalier Universitaire, or CHU) and another at a private Belgian hospital – to encourage them to purchase Balt’s endovascular embolization coils and related devices.

The scheme unfolded in two stages. Initially, from 2013 to 2017, a consultant for Blockade Medical (later acquired by Balt) gave cash payments directly to the French doctor, tied to the number of coils he implanted. Then, from 2017 onward, Tilman, through his Belgian company “M.,” entered into fake consulting contracts with the French physician, funneling about EUR539,000 in payments that were not reported to the hospital or on France’s “Transparence Santé” website, which is France’s equivalent to the US Sunshine Act’s reporting.

Tilman also submitted false invoices to Balt for fictitious training services to boost the funds available for these payments and arranged similar consulting deals with the Belgian doctor’s company, paying approximately EUR54,800 based on the volume of coil implantation performed by the French physician.

The coordinated resolutions

A key jurisdictional distinction separates the two resolutions. The DOJ declination addresses only the conduct involving the French physician, who qualified as a “foreign official” under the FCPA by virtue of his position at a state-owned CHU, and does not extend to the Belgian physician employed by a private hospital. The CJIP covers both schemes, as Sapin II also prohibits private-sector bribery.

While DOJ could also theoretically reach private sector bribery – for example, under the Travel Act – historical FCPA cases prosecuted by DOJ have rarely included both types of criminal conduct. However, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has more frequently enforced private sector bribery from a civil enforcement perspective.

The DOJ declination

DOJ declined to prosecute Balt, but the agreement still required Balt to pay approximately USD1.2 million in disgorgement. The declination was based on Balt’s timely and voluntary self-disclosure (made while its internal investigation was still ongoing), full and proactive cooperation – including providing information on the individuals involved – prompt remediation, the absence of aggravating circumstances, and Balt’s agreement to enter into a parallel resolution with French authorities with additional penalties paid to France. Critically, DOJ did not impose a monitor, crediting the compliance oversight that would be imposed under the French system.

The PNF and CJIP

The PNF entered into a CJIP with Balt, arising from a preliminary investigation it opened on September 7, 2023, following Balt’s voluntary disclosure to the PNF on May 22, 2023 – made simultaneously with its disclosure to DOJ. The CJIP fine totals EUR1,765,493 – calculated as a restitutionary component of EUR2,118,209, plus a punitive component of EUR816,145, minus a deduction of EUR1,168,861, expressly crediting the disgorgement made as part of DOJ’s declination (a calibrated mechanism to avoid duplicative punishment or “piling on”).

Among mitigating factors, the PNF credited Balt’s “révélation spontanée” – made “particularly rapidly” after management discovered the facts – the quality of its internal investigations, its active cooperation, and its unequivocal acknowledgment of the facts. The CJIP also imposes a three-year compliance program under the Agence Française Anticorruption (AFA), with costs funded by Balt of up to EUR700,000.

PNF prosecutor Céline Guillet emphasized the value of early disclosure: “Balt did not wait to complete its entire internal investigation before coming to us. We asked them to stop so that we could conduct our own, and thanks to the element of surprise, we were able to access data that, in another scenario, would have been erased.”

Individual accountability

Both resolutions leave open the possibility for individual prosecutions in both jurisdictions. Ferrera and Tilman each face up to five years per bribery charge and 20 years per money laundering charge, and the PNF confirmed that judicial proceedings will continue for the individuals on both sides of the Atlantic.

Key takeaways and practical implications

The Balt resolution offers several important insights for companies navigating cross-border anti-corruption risk:

• Recognition of autorévélation in France: This is the first time the PNF has explicitly cited voluntary self-disclosure as a mitigating factor in a CJIP, representing a significant evolution in French enforcement practice and a growing convergence with the US system. While autorévélation is not a legal prerequisite for a CJIP – a company must demonstrate “good faith,” and autorévélation is one indicator among several – the PNF’s emphatic treatment of it in this case may raise the practical bar for companies that are discovered through external means rather than coming to the PNF proactively. Companies and their counsel may consider whether the practical threshold for securing a CJIP has shifted.
  
  
• Coordinated resolutions and the imperative of concurrent disclosure: The Balt resolution provides a constructive template for multi-jurisdictional enforcement – with PNF deducting the DOJ disgorgement from its fine and DOJ deferring to AFA oversight, rather than imposing its own monitor. Notably, this model worked because Balt disclosed to both authorities simultaneously. Under the new CEP, voluntary self-disclosure must be “timely,” and a delayed US disclosure made after cooperation with foreign authorities is already underway may not qualify. This creates a strong incentive toward concurrent disclosures, which may entail engaging counsel with experience in both systems from the outset.
  
  For example, in a case involving senior management and no voluntary self-disclosure last fall, Millicom faced a USD60 million criminal penalty (more than 100 percent of total profits resulting from the criminal conduct) and deferred prosecution agreement. Meanwhile, Balt’s EUR816,145 punitive penalty imposed by the PNF was approximately 40 percent of profits resulting from the criminal conduct.
  
  Additionally, the window for companies to make a decision regarding self-disclosure continues to narrow as whistleblower programs – including DOJ's Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program launched in 2024 – create direct financial incentives for insiders or competitors to report misconduct, while enforcement agencies increasingly rely on data analytics and inter-agency coordination to detect it independently.
  
  For companies, the practical implication is straightforward: Detection risk has not diminished, nor has it increased. However, the source of detection and its consequences may be shifting. Even if US enforcement becomes less active, European authorities could be positioned to fill the gap, and misconduct discovered abroad may still reach DOJ through formal Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) channels or other mechanisms.
  
  
• Individual accountability: The indictment of Ferrera and Tilman two weeks before the corporate resolution – and the PNF’s express confirmation that individual proceedings will continue on both sides of the Atlantic – reinforces the principle that individual accountability remains a top enforcement priority regardless of the corporate outcome. This places a premium on early individual-level risk assessments during internal investigations, as well as ensuring that individuals are provided individual counsel if appropriate.
  
  
• Notable limitations of the DOJ resolution: The Balt resolution is largely consistent with the enforcement framework outlined in the Criminal Division’s May 2025 white collar crime memorandum and the June 2025 FCPA guidelines – but it also invites questions about future enforcement direction. The resolution aligns with the white collar memorandum’s emphasis on individual accountability: DOJ’s first priority remains “to prosecute individual criminals,” and the indictment of Ferrera and Tilman alongside the corporate declination reflects that principle. The decision not to impose a compliance monitor is consistent with the memorandum’s directive that monitors “must only be imposed when they are necessary” and should be “narrowly tailored.” The resolution also reflects the FCPA guidelines’ focus on “serious misconduct” bearing “strong indicia of corrupt intent” – in this case, substantial bribes, sham consulting agreements, and sophisticated concealment efforts.
  
  That said, the Balt investigation predates the current enforcement framework: The voluntary self-disclosures were made in May 2023, and much of the investigative work and bilateral cooperation occurred throughout 2023 and 2024. This framework predated 1) President Donald Trump’s February 2025 Executive Order 14209, “Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security,” and 2) the June 2025 guidelines refocusing priorities on cartels and transnational criminal organizations, conduct harming “specific and identifiable” US entities, and bribery in sectors like “defense, intelligence, or critical infrastructure” that directly threatens US national security.
  
  The Balt scheme – involving a French company bribing physicians in France and Belgium to sell medical devices – does not explicitly implicate these newly articulated priorities. While many other investigations were discontinued during 2025, DOJ notably chose to continue the matter through resolution. This may suggest that legacy investigations with strong evidence, as well as cooperation and remediation, will still be brought to conclusion. Whether new FCPA matters with similar fact patterns would be initiated – or prioritized – under the current guidelines remains an open question.
  
  
• Continued focus on life sciences: The Balt resolution is a reminder that the life sciences sector remains a focus of anti-corruption enforcement, both in the US and in Europe. The AFA announced in 2025 that it would focus its anti-corruption audit efforts on life sciences companies operating in France, and this resolution underscores that commitment in concrete terms. The scheme's mechanics – sham consulting agreements, undisclosed payments to healthcare professionals, and concealment from Sunshine Act reporting systems – represent a well-known and recurring risk pattern in the industry, one that enforcement authorities have shown little inclination to deprioritize. The resolution also reemphasizes that these risks arise not only under the FCPA (e.g., when healthcare professionals work at state entities and thus qualify as "foreign officials"), but also under regimes like Sapin II that extend to private-sector corruption, broadening the universe of conduct that can trigger enforcement action. For life sciences companies operating across borders, this may reinforce the need for rigorous compliance programs – particularly around interactions with healthcare professionals, consulting arrangements, and transparency reporting – and for proactive monitoring of evolving regulatory expectations in each jurisdiction where they operate.

Looking ahead

The Balt resolution represents a convergence of several significant enforcement developments: the first declination under DOJ’s Department-wide CEP, the first explicit recognition of autorévélation as a mitigating factor in a French CJIP, and a coordinated resolution that avoided the piling on of duplicative punishment while preserving each authority’s independent enforcement prerogatives.

For companies operating across jurisdictions – particularly in regulated sectors such as life sciences – the resolution underscores the importance of maintaining robust compliance infrastructure, conducting thorough internal investigations when potential misconduct surfaces, and engaging counsel with multi-jurisdictional experience early in the process to navigate the complex strategic considerations surrounding voluntary self-disclosure.

For more information, please contact the authors.